

SOVIET NOSTALGIA

UASCORE 2016 - 2018

Variables from Phase 1 & Phase 2
Panel sample: 6102



USAID




SOVIET NOSTALGIA: HEATMAPS 2016 - 2018

Soviet Nostalgia 2016

5.8


Average score for Ukraine 2016
Soviet nostalgia



Soviet Nostalgia 2018

5.5

Average score for Ukraine 2018
Soviet nostalgia



SOVIET NOSTALGIA: STABILITY OF SOVIET NOSTALGIA 2016 - 2018

All Ukraine

East Ukraine

Soviet nostalgia in 2018 is predicted by soviet nostalgia in 2016. This is not surprising at all, but it is interesting to see that this effect is much stronger in the West than the East. In other words, someone who was not nostalgic about the soviet times in 2016 can become nostalgic in 2018; but this is more likely to happen in the East.

Soviet Nostalgia 2016

0.34

Soviet Nostalgia 2018

Soviet Nostalgia 2016

0.17

Soviet Nostalgia 2018

Soviet Nostalgia

The extent to which one regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union and believes that life was better before 1991.

SOVIET NOSTALGIA: PROTECTIVE FACTORS IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Protective/resilience factors that can interrupt link between Soviet Nostalgia from Time 1 to Time 2

State Services
Economic Security





Soviet Nostalgia 2016

Soviet Nostalgia 2018

Dnipropetrovska has lowest level of **economic security**, indicating that it would be a good target for interventions.

Intervention on **state services** for older age group in Kharkivska would be beneficial as this has lowest state services score.


SOVIET NOSTALGIA: DISTRIBUTION IN UKRAINE





- Steady Low pct
- Decreasing pct
- Increasing pct
- Steady High pct

SOVIET NOSTALGIA: DISTRIBUTION IN THE EASTERN UKRAINE

All Ukraine



East Ukraine



- Steady Low pct
- Decreasing pct
- Increasing pct
- Steady High pct

SOVIET NOSTALGIA: CLUSTER PROFILES FOR EASTERN UKRAINE

Soviet Nostalgia Profiles

	Soviet Nostalgia 2016	Soviet Nostalgia 2018	
Steady High	8.5	8.5	Oldest (average 57 years old), conservative and pro-Russian group, who think <u>authorities do not care about the people</u> . Low economic and personal security, they think that ordinary people can not change things in society.
Increasing	2.8	7.4	Increasingly pro-Russia group, with low economic security, they think <u>authorities do not care about the people</u> . They are becoming more and more pessimistic about the country's future and their role in it.
Decreasing	7.2	3.5	With anti-Russia orientation, this group believes that <u>authorities care about them</u> . They have high employment status and are satisfied with state services. They are optimistic about the country's future.
Steady Low	2.5	2.5	Youngest (average 39 years old) and least conservative, this group supports pro-EU the most. With high employment status, they are optimistic about the country's future and their role in it.

SOVIET NOSTALGIA:

MODERATORS TESTED THAT DID HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IN
EASTERN UKRAINE

Psychosocial Index

Social skills

Depression

Civic responsibility

Civic optimism

Civic engagement

Community cooperation

Social competence

Family support

Family coherence

Empathy

Pro-EU orientation

Perceived EU benefit

Pro-free market orientation

Trust in media

Social tolerance

Pro-HR

Fatigue from conflict

Anti-east

Anti-west

Perceived corruption

Marginalisation

Information consumption

Exposure to Pro-Russia media

Vocational and literacy skills

Education level

Income level

Ukrainian nationalism

Conservative values

Readiness for violence

Positive entrepreneurship environment

Negative stereotypes pro-EU

Intergroup contact frequency: Maidan activists

Intergroup tension