

# SCORE Ukraine

Phase Two (2018)  
Evidence-based Policy Brief

Analysis and recommendations on:

- Fostering Constructive Citizenship and Unifying National Visions in Ukraine
- Support and Skepticism for the Ukraine Reform Process
- Human Cost of Conflict
- Intergroup Relations and Future of the Donbas

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## Abbreviations

Anova – Analysis of Variance

GCA – Government controlled areas of Ukraine

Growth from Knowledge (GfK) Survey Company

NGCA – Non-government controlled areas of Ukraine

PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

SCORE – Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index

SeeD – Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development

UCBI – Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative

USAID – The United States Agency for International Development

USAID/OTI – Office of Transition Initiatives

# Introduction to SCORE Methodology and Process

## What is the SCORE Index and what can it do?

Chronic political instability, social volatility, proliferation of non-state armed groups, weak governance systems, and toxic disputes over land and natural resources is costing human lives, hindering global development and undermining sustainable peace efforts across the globe. Countries such as Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey, Syria, South Sudan, Yemen and Mali are suffering from intractable protracted conflicts. Critically, bringing stability and security to the estimated 1.2 billion people living in fragile and conflict affected territories requires an innovative, participatory and robust set of approaches and tools which better navigate routes to sustainable conflict transformation. Compared to the resources dedicated to war and conflict, the financial and human resources available to invest in peacebuilding is significantly limited. Effective, efficient and strategic use of limited resources to influence positive change in conflict transformation and sustaining peace necessitates a deep grasp of conflict drivers, as they manifest in each specific context, in order to design appropriately targeted and cost-effective programmatic interventions.

Peacebuilding and development programs are all too often designed on the basis of limited inputs from a small number of in-country experts or conflict analysis consultants, with insufficient data-driven insights. Evidence-based decision and policy making is absolutely essential to improve peacebuilding and conflict transformation efforts, and in fostering social harmony both vertically (with governance institutions and citizens) and horizontally (between different groups in society). Yet, existing assessment approaches are often challenged when it comes to empirically linking potential drivers of conflict with desired peace outcomes in a way that can help resolve policy and programmatic dilemmas. As such, genuine efforts and investments can often miss the mark in producing the outcomes and societal change they seek to influence.

The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) index seeks to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts based on evidence, and was designed to address the abovementioned deficits in informing sustainable processes of conflict transformation. As a customizable, flexible and evidence-based diagnostic and predictive assessment instrument, the SCORE index can be utilized to identify programmatic entry points which are most likely to have a positive impact on peacebuilding outcomes. From this perspective, the SCORE index speaks to the concerns of the peacebuilding community, often comprising national and international actors who are still uncertain about the real efficacy of their investments. The SCORE index offers governments, donors and peacebuilding organizations the opportunity to systematically design and test conflict transformation theories of change before sponsoring and endorsing new peace-building programs.

The SCORE index draws inspiration from multiple scientific disciplines such as sociology, psychology, international relations and security studies and is flexible enough to incorporate new research findings, global policy guidelines and the realities of each local and regional context. It was developed in 2012 in Cyprus by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) in partnership between UNDP and funded by USAID. The SCORE Index has so far been implemented in multiple contexts beyond Cyprus, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, Ukraine, Liberia, Moldova and Iraq.

The backbone of the SCORE Index is founded upon participatory research based on mixed-methods, where multi-level stakeholder consultations, focus groups and interviews are conducted to inform the calibration of the SCORE questionnaire, which draws from the extensive SCORE library of measurement instruments and indicators. Figure 1 below illustrates the SCORE process cycle.

**Figure 1. SCORE Process Cycle**



The SCORE Index eschews the one-size-fits-all approach that often characterizes cross-national indices. To ensure that each SCORE Index reliably captures the societal dynamics of the specific country where it is being implemented, the process typically begins with inclusive consultations with a broad cross-section of national stakeholders such as civil society, academia, government, business leadership and grassroots communities. These contribute to an initial in-depth understanding of societal dynamics in relation to outcomes of interest, while the technique of system mapping (detailed and integrated conceptual models) is utilized to capture and validate complex inter-relations between different societal, economic, political and individual dynamics and components. With such a conceptual framework designed, using inclusive and participatory dialogue techniques, appropriate measurement instruments are then selected, adapted and designed – either from the existing library of SCORE instruments or custom-made for the specific country.

The SCORE Index can flexibly integrate different modalities of data collection as required, including surveys, discourse analysis, expert assessments and draws its strength from advanced analytical and statistical toolkits. Large SCORE sample frames are then designed in a way to ensure that results can be reported with a high level of confidence for different sub-regions within the country, but also for distinct societal groups of interest (e.g. specific ethnic communities or social demographics such as internally displaced communities). The actual fieldwork is usually conducted in collaboration with established national researchers or research agencies, who can display the needed level of cultural and contextual awareness and sensitivity to assure a reliable data collection process. Results are processed using advanced data analysis techniques (e.g. factor analysis, anova analysis, regression and structured equation modelling) from which robust metrics are designed for multiple indicators, which are translated into network analysis and predictive models that can reveal the intricate relationship between different indicators and groups. This modelling process is used to suggest effective entry points to design evidenced-based projects and policies.

Using participatory research principles, preliminary SCORE results are interpreted through multi-level stakeholder consultations and dialogue groups, which informs further data analysis and design of participatory policy briefs. Such a close cooperation and communication with the key stakeholders as well as grassroots not only adds richness, depth and value to the SCORE findings but also builds ownership and triggers constructive public debate ensuring that the final SCORE products are as contextual and as impactful as possible. The analysis and recommendations presented in this booklet is based on this extensive and inclusive process framework.

## The SCORE Vocabulary

- **Conceptual model:** Theory of change and system map of different indicators, assumptions and societal dynamics designed based on multi-level stakeholder consultations.
- **Outcomes of interest:** Identified desirable and high priority normative objectives that relate to assessing and fostering social coherence in a given context (i.e. Intergroup harmony, mitigating violent tendencies, positive youth socialization).
- **Indicators:** The components of the conceptual model are translated into metrics and indicators that are quantifiable and measurable via public opinion polls. Each indicator that is measuring a particular phenomenon (e.g. economic security, discrimination towards out groups, belief in human rights, support for certain policy options, post-traumatic stress disorder and etc.) is assessed with minimum 3 questionnaire items, which are scaled following reliability tests, to ensure that SCORE can robustly capture different dynamics underlying the given indicator.
- **Drivers/Predictors:** Indicators that have a strong positive or negative impact on the outcome of interest are called drivers or predictors, as they provide strategic entry points that hold the most likelihood of impact on the desired outcome of interest.
- **Heatmaps:** A score over 10, where 0 means that the phenomenon indicator is measuring is not observed in the context at all and 10 means that it is observed strongly and prevalently, is calculated for **each indicator**. Heatmaps demonstrate the regional differences of these scores in order to identify areas of concern and tailor interventions more precisely. For example, Personal Security indicator is measured through the following questions in Ukraine:
  - *To what extent do you feel safe from violence in your daily life?*
  - *To what extent do you feel confident that the police or other institutions can protect you from violence?*
  - *To what extent would you feel safe walking alone in the street at night?*

A score of 0 for personal security would mean that no one in a given society feels secure at a personal level, while 10 would signify that every person feels absolutely secure. As such, a heatmap of personal security for Ukraine illustrates the scores for each of the 24 oblasts and regional variance in sense of personal security across the country.

- **Predictive models:** Based on advanced statistical analysis such as regression, network analysis and structural equation modelling, predictive models investigate the relationship between different indicators and the outcomes of interest. Predictive models reveal those indicators that may have a reinforcing or mitigating influence on other indicators as well as the outcome. While the first wave of SCORE can be used for identifying directional correlations and benchmarking, second and third waves of SCORE where temporal comparisons are possible can identify trends and causal relationships.
- **Complex network analysis:** This analysis shows the correlations between indicators, and how they cluster themselves (they are self-organized with no central authority) based on their relationships in the networks. The size of the indicator bubbles used in this booklet represents the degree of its connectedness in the network, while the color of the connecting lines represents the nature of the relationship - **blue** symbolizes a positive correlation, and **red** symbolizes a negative correlation. The thickness of the lines represents the strength of the correlation – the thicker the line the stronger the relationship.

## SCORE Ukraine Phase Two Overview and Methodology

In 2015, SeeD was invited to implement the SCORE Index in Ukraine, by the USAID/OTI supported program “Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative” (UCBI). To address the issues underpinning community tensions and cohesion, SeeD in partnership with UCBI implemented the Phase One of the SCORE in Ukraine between August 2015 – December 2016<sup>1</sup>. SCORE Phase One succeeded in developing evidence-based and participatory policy briefs and communication messages, and mobilized significant interest among a wide range of key stakeholders (e.g. senior policy makers, journalists, civil society).

USAID and SeeD acknowledged that it is crucial to conduct longitudinal and comparative research that can provide temporal analysis in order to monitor situations in different settings. Therefore, a SCORE Phase Two was calibrated in the summer of 2017 which aimed to:

- Monitor prevailing societal and inter-group dynamics;
- Detect human security threats that different communities are experiencing;
- Investigate how alternative policies would enhance or undermine social cohesion, civic participation and sense of security in Ukraine;
- Provide a deeper investigation into zones of crisis, priority issues or specific societal tensions identified in Phase One.

SCORE Ukraine Phase Two was calibrated in the summer of 2017 with stakeholder consultations and 8 regional focus groups conducted in Kherson, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Severodonetsk and Odessa. Following the completion of the calibration process and conceptual modeling, the Phase Two questionnaire was designed and fieldwork was deployed in January 2018 by Growth from Knowledge (GfK) Survey Company.

Figure 2 below summarizes the conceptual model and areas of investigation for SCORE Ukraine Phase Two process. While maintaining strong comparability with Phase One, the Phase Two was calibrated with the following priorities:

- Deeper questioning about the peace process: While Phase One measured general support for the peace process and the Minsk Agreements, Phase Two delved deeper into investigating more concrete indicators and policy options particularly about attitudes towards the conflict in the East and possible peacebuilding formulas.
- Deeper questioning about policy reforms: Similarly, while Phase One measured general support for some of the policy reforms, Phase Two assessed the support for these reform packages in a more comprehensive way in order to understand concerns, anxieties and priorities that drive or undermine support for the reform process in Ukraine.
- Expansion of the civic engagement and citizenship component: SCORE Phase One reports low levels of formalized civic engagement in Ukraine, which suggests that there is a passive model of citizenship where the majority of people are not actively involved in civic matters. Surprisingly however, civic engagement also positively predicts readiness for political violence. This finding suggests that manifestations of civic engagement in Ukraine tend to take place within a context of supporting the military operations. Building on these findings, SCORE Phase further investigated constructive citizenship and positive civic attitudes, including civic identity, civic responsibility and sense of agency<sup>2</sup>.
- Deeper questioning about the peace process: While Phase One measured general support for the peace process and the Minsk Agreements, Phase Two delved deeper into investigating more concrete

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
<sup>1</sup> SCORE Ukraine data and findings can be accessed at [www.scoreforpeace.org](http://www.scoreforpeace.org)

<sup>2</sup> For these and other indicators definitions please consult the glossary at the end of the booklet.

indicators and policy options particularly about attitudes towards the conflict in the East and possible peacebuilding formulas.

- Deeper questioning about policy reforms: Similarly, while Phase One measured general support for some of the policy reforms, Phase Two assessed the support for these reform packages in a more comprehensive way in order to understand concerns, anxieties and priorities that drive or undermine support for the reform process in Ukraine.

**Figure 2. Simplified Conceptual Model for the SCORE Ukraine Phase Two**



The Phase Two sample frame included a strong pane sample which allowed for robust and unique analysis of causal relationships and changes in civic attitudes. In total 9,018 face-to-face household interviews in 24 oblasts and Kyiv city were conducted via random stratified sampling. The overall reach of panel respondents amounted to 81.4% of the total sample. In other words, 6,102 respondents participated Phase One were recruited to participate in Phase Two. Furthermore, 1,042 interviews were conducted in non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts via random stratified sampling. Due to accessibility challenges, 445 face-to-face interviews were conducted in NGCA of Donetska and 597 telephone interviews in NGCA of Luhanska (via random generation of phone numbers) were completed in total. In sum, the findings presented in this policy booklet is based upon focus group and stakeholder consultations and quantitative fieldwork with 10,060 respondents nationwide including NGCA of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts. The regional analysis presented in this booklet is based on the regional clustering of oblasts as illustrated in the map below:



**Figure 3: Regional oblast clusters**



The chapters of this booklet are organized thematically around the outcomes of interest identified during the calibration phase and informed by robust empirical evidence. The first chapter ‘**Fostering Constructive Citizenship and Unifying National Visions in Ukraine**’ that combines outcomes one and two (See Figure 2), explores the preconditions for constructive citizenship. It looks into how different civic attitudes are instrumental in shaping the future political, economic and societal progress in Ukraine. The second chapter titled ‘**Support and Skepticism for the Ukraine Reform Process**’ corresponds to outcome 3 and analyses attitudes towards the reform process and investigates underlying concerns and anxieties that strengthen or hinder support for different reform packages. The third chapter – ‘**Human Cost of Conflict**’ - emerged from the empirical data and sheds light on the key role psychosocial factors play on social cohesion dynamics. In this third chapter SCORE findings are used to understand how an individual’s relationship to conflict affects the citizens of Ukraine as well as social, political and economic progress in the country. The fourth chapter on ‘**Intergroup Relations and Future of Donbas**’ is related to outcome four and focuses on the relationship between different groups in society and their varying attitudes towards the conflict and the future of Donbas. Finally, the fifth chapter summarizes evidence-based policy recommendations which are based on the SCORE Phase Two findings and stakeholder consultations and establishes pathways to durable conflict transformation and social cohesion in Ukraine.

# Chapter 1: Fostering Constructive Citizenship and Unifying National Visions in Ukraine

## Summary of Key Findings

### What improved since 2016?

- Civic optimism increased.
- Exclusive Ukrainian nationalism decreased.
- Support for a pluralistic Ukrainian identity is promising!

### What got worse since 2016?

- Tolerance for corruption increased significantly.
- Belief in the benefit of the EU decreased.
- There is prevalent skepticism regarding EU's stability.

### What remained the same since 2016?

- Readiness for violence is still concerning.
- Civic engagement remained low.
- Social tolerance remained low.

### What should be done?

- Create a conducive environment for constructive citizenship by improving good governance, and focusing on human security and service delivery.
- Empower citizens by designing effective civic participation mechanisms, and improving sense of agency and civic responsibility.
- Nurture societal harmony by fostering social tolerance and human rights ethos.

## Introduction

This chapter specifically focuses on identifying the drivers and strategic entry points for value-driven constructive citizenship to inform effective policy and program design that can foster social cohesion across Ukraine. The concept of constructive citizenship, underpinned by civic engagement, sense of agency, social tolerance and civic responsibility is crucial for both inclusive economic growth and healthy, representative democracies (See glossary for definitions). This is undoubtedly valid for Ukraine as well, where positive civic attitudes are strongly linked with support for constructive policies (e.g. reforms and peace talks), intergroup harmony and future-oriented positive national vision (e.g. pro-EU orientation), and thus show themselves as prerequisites for driving the country forward. As such, **building a progressive and tolerant EU orientation (as opposed to exclusive) that can unify the country towards a shared future vision needs to be linked to the concept of constructive citizenship, social tolerance and to the commitment to uphold human rights rather than polarizing “us vs. them” and “West vs. East” narratives.** The SCORE Ukraine study can help us quantify these desired civic attitudes and values, and subsequently identify their precise drivers in a more concrete way. The analysis in this chapter focuses on exploring the key drivers and entry points (e.g. civic optimism, sense of agency) that can foster constructive citizenship in Ukraine.

In general, the juxtaposition of pro-EU orientation and relations with Russia (be it economic, political, cultural or familial) is seen as mutually exclusive, and underpins the polarizing narratives about national identity, unity and future visions across the country. Numerous civic attitude indicators ranging from civic optimism to pro-EU orientation, and from soviet nostalgia to national identity highlight the major regional differences in citizenship orientations across Ukraine. For instance, while we observe more harmonious

coexistence between different citizenship orientations in the northern and southern parts of the country, this is more polarized in the West. The SCORE Ukraine Phase Two study explored the drivers that can undermine or reinforce positive civic attitudes in order to identify strategic policy and program entry points that can nurture value-driven active citizenship, and hence facilitate intergroup harmony and contribute to resilient social cohesion in Ukraine.

## Civic Attitudes SCORE Ukraine Phase Two Findings

One of the key findings of the SCORE Ukraine 2018 study concerns deepening citizen apathy and disconnectedness towards events in the East of the country, fueled by the failure to bring an end to the ongoing conflict. **Apathy and disconnectedness is one of the key obstacles to building a value-driven constructive citizenship in Ukraine.** Besides low civic engagement and *sense of agency*, apathy and disconnectedness are strongly associated with intergroup tension, psychosocial functioning skills and mental health as well. In other words, the disconnected people feels “out of place” and lacks the civic skills to navigate the political and social disagreements. Individuals who suffer from challenges such as post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), aggression, depression and anxiety, and those with weaker social skills and executive functioning skills find it harder to and exercise their civic responsibilities and share a sense of agency.

The “Sense of agency” indicator illustrated in Figure 3 relates to citizens’ sense of empowerment as agents of change in their communities. Where 0 means that no one believes they can bring about positive change in their communities and 10 means that everyone feels empowered to become change makers, the country average for sense of agency is 4.5. While some oblasts, such as Ternopil'ska, Volyn'ska and Zakarpatska show significantly stronger levels of agency, citizens in the Mykolaiv'ska oblast feel significantly disenfranchised. Figure 4 illustrates the aggressive traits of individuals in daily life. Where 0 means that no one has expresses aggressive and confrontational traits and 10 means that everyone suffers from severe aggression, the country average is 2.1. While some oblasts float around the country average, high levels of daily aggression in Chernivetska, Ivano-Frankiv'ska and Zhitomir'ska call for attention and further investigation.

Figure 3. Sense of agency





Figure 4. Intergroup tension



In order to identify potential bridge makers in society, SCORE Ukraine study investigated civic and political attitudes of Ukrainian citizens. Based on indicators about political orientation and feelings (hostile or tolerant) towards different political groups, five distinct groups have been identified (Figure 5):

- *Group 1: Tolerant traditionalists (7%),* who are leaning more towards pro-Russia political orientation<sup>3</sup>, have high level of soviet nostalgia, low trust in institutions, low personal and

<sup>3</sup> In SCORE Pro-Russia political orientation is the degree to which one supports Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and believes in the organic and historical link between the two countries.

economic security. Although they are more likely to blame Ukraine and the West for the conflict, this group displays no hostility towards Pro-EU oriented people, strongly supports Donbas reintegration and expresses high social tolerance.

- *Group 2: Tolerant progressives (31%)*, who support pro-European political trajectory, have lower civic optimism and hence see a bleak future. This group also has the lowest level of violent tendencies, strong political security and the highest support for Donbas reintegration. They display no hostility towards pro-Russia oriented group and have high social tolerance.
- *Group 3: Uncompromizing progressives (15%)*, who have high support of pro-EU country's direction and high support for Donbas reintegration, but express strong hostility to pro-Russian oriented people, have high violent tendencies and very low support for peace talks. This group has also strong nationalistic feelings.
- *Group 4: Disconnected (45%)*, who do not display any clear preference for Russia or the EU, and are generally less involved in political issues. This group has high tolerance to corruption and low support for reforms. They are more likely to suffer from PTSD and aggression and have weak executive and social skills. They are also less optimistic about the future and feel stronger levels of intergroup tension.
- *Group 5: Hostile (2%)*, who are very similar to the Disconnected group in terms of psychosocial challenges, low support for reforms and high tolerance for corruption. This group expresses high levels of social intolerance, and is characterized by low political, personal and economic security, and is distrustful of state institutions and the members of their community. They also have lowest support for Donbas reintegration and are very hostile towards both pro-EU and pro-Russian oriented people.

This segmentation analysis based political orientation and intergroup feelings illustrates two key groups, namely tolerant traditionalist and tolerant progressives, who are the potential change makers in society. While tolerant progressives are more future oriented, with a progressive vision to take the country forward, traditionalist are more nostalgic about the past, but both groups share high levels of tolerance and openness to dialogue, and low levels of hostility. As such, they can act as potential bridge builders between the uncompromising and disconnected groups. The Figure 5 below illustrates the characteristics of these 5 groups in more detail.

**Figure 5. Segmentation analysis based on political orientation and intergroup feelings**


| Tolerant Traditionalists                                  | Tolerant Progressives                          | Uncompromizing Progressives                             | Disconnected  | Hostile   |
|---|--|---|---|---|
| High soviet nostalgia (8.1)                               | The lowest readiness for violence (1.5)        | High information consumption (5.8)                      | High tolerance to corruption (2.7) and lower perceived corruption (6.9)                     | High tolerance to corruption (2.8) and lower perceived corruption (6.9)                       |
| Lower trust in national (1.4) and local (2.8) authorities | Low civic optimism (3.8)                       | High civic optimism (6.5)                               | Weak support for anti-corruption reform (6.8), decentralization & deregulation reform (6.0) | Weaker support for anti-corruption reform (7.0), decentralization & deregulation reform (5.9) |
| Low personal (4.4) and economic (4.4) security            | Higher trust in security services (4.7)        | Higher trust in security services (4.9)                 | Support rebel & Russian Operations (2.4)  | Lower trust in community (4.3)  |
| Lower satisfaction with state service delivery (4.3)      | High social tolerance (5.4)                    | Low support of Minsk agreements (4.6)                   | Lower family coherence (7)  | Lowest social tolerance (3.4)   |
| High social tolerance (5)                                 | High political security (7.3)                  | Higher personal (5.4) and high political (7.7) security | Higher PTSD (1.7)   | Lowest political (5.2) and lower personal (4.0) and economic (4.6) security                   |
| Lower blame of Russia and rebels (5.1)                    | Highest support for Donbas reintegration (6.4) | High blame of Russia and rebels (8.7)                   | Lower skills of perspective taking (5.4)  | Lowest trust in local authorities (2.8)   |
| Low Ukrainian nationalism (2.8)                           |  | Lower blame of Ukraine and the West (4.6)               | Higher aggression (2.4)   | Lower skills of perspective taking (5.4)  |
| High blame of Ukraine and the West (7)                    |  | High Ukrainian nationalism (6.5)                        | Lowest optimism (trait) (6.8)   | Lowest optimism (trait) (6.7)   |
| Higher support for amnesty (5.9)                          |  | Lowest support for Donbas separation (0.86)             | Highest pessimism (trait) (5.0)   | Highest pessimism (trait) (4.9)   |
| Highest support for peace talks (8.4)                     |  | Support for Donbas reintegration (6)                    | Lower executive skills (7.4)  | Support rebel & Russian Operations (2.6)  |
| Low support for Ukrainian army operations (1.7)           |  |   | Support for Donbas reintegration (5.6)  | Lowest support for Donbas reintegration (5.2)   |
| Low support for privatization reform (2.6)                |  |   |   |   |
| Support for Donbas reintegration (5.8)                    |  |   |   |   |


Comparing the overall distribution of these 5 groups to SCORE Phase One findings from 2016, we can observe the following changes (See Figure 6):

1. Progressive groups have grown by 16% overall. While the largest concentration of citizens in the Uncompromising Progressives' group is in western Ukraine, northern and southern oblasts have the largest number of people who belong to the Tolerant Progressives group. The Tolerant Progressives group grew significantly in the southern oblasts by 25% compared to 2016.
2. Tolerant Traditionalists group have decreased by 12%, by mostly shifting to the Disconnected group or the Tolerant Progressives' group. The largest concentration of Tolerant Traditionalists is in the South and East of the country. Unsurprisingly, the largest decrease in the percentage of Tolerant Traditionalists has taken place in these two regions by.
3. Disconnected group grew by 11%, making up 45% of the Ukrainian society. Largest concentration of the disconnected groups can be observed in the eastern, central and northern oblasts, with the central oblasts demonstrating the largest increase from 44% in 2016 to 59% in 2018.
4. A new Hostile group appeared in the SCORE 2018 segmentation analysis, constituting approximately 2% of the population, this group is largely concentrated in northern, central and eastern oblasts. However, on the oblast level, we can observe a high concentration (6.6%) of this group in the Donetsk oblast.
5. Polarized pro-Russia group that made up to 17% of the Ukrainian population in 2016, with the biggest concentration observed in the eastern and southern oblasts, 'disappeared' in 2018. SCORE shows that majority of this group had shifted to Disconnected, and approximately 5% of this group became hostile.

These shifts between groups can be explained by multiple factors, from increased public debate in Ukraine, to de-escalation of the conflict, from improving intergroup relations to the effect of returning combatants and their experiences. However, SCORE findings also show that people with Pro-Russia political orientation express significantly lower political security (feeling free to speak out without fearing consequences), and thus may have grown latent.

**Figure 6. Change in segmentation analysis of citizens and regional distribution**







### Exploring Country Trends and Regional Differences

The SCORE findings regarding civic attitudes and political orientations highlight the key temporal changes between 2016 and 2018. In general, SCORE Ukraine revealed low levels of ‘formalized civic engagement’ (e.g. signing petitions, participating in civil society events and initiatives), ‘civic optimism’ (e.g. the next generations will be better off), ‘critical literacy’ (e.g. questioning sources of information and news) and ‘sense of agency’ (e.g. feeling empowered to become a change maker in society). While levels of ‘social tolerance’ and ‘readiness for political violence’ remain a concern, SCORE 2018 findings also show a significant increase in ‘tolerance to corruption’, where people accept the normalization of corruption in daily life. On a positive note, **the promising levels of ‘pluralistic Ukrainian identity’, ‘belief in human rights’** (See Figure 7 and 8) and ‘civic responsibility’ suggest a strong potential to nurture a civic identity **founded upon constructive citizenship in Ukraine** (for more detailed indicator descriptions please see the glossary at the end of this booklet). **In order to channel these positive civic attitudes towards positive societal change, findings clearly emphasize the importance of improving good governance including service delivery and human security.** It is also clear that the civic apathy and disconnectedness which is born from widespread disillusionment with the stalled efforts to end the conflict in the East needs addressing, as does the perception that only elites benefit from any progress in the country.

Figure 7. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity

Figure 8. Belief in human rights



Looking at the multiple civic attitude indicators measured by SCORE Ukraine, we can observe the following trends on the country level and identify regional differences:

- Civic optimism increased significantly from 4.6 in 2016 to 5.1 in 2018 but remains relatively low. Although people are skeptical about the direction of the country and anxious about the future on the whole; we observe stronger optimism in western compared to central and eastern Ukraine, a tendency that is similar to 2016 findings.
- Ukrainian nationalism decreased significantly from 5.6 in 2016 to 4.8 in 2018 but remains as an element of polarization between eastern and western oblasts. While patriotism and a strong sense of civic identity is crucial for national unity, exclusive notions of nationalism and ethnic identity can be highly divisive.
- Soviet nostalgia, which is embedded in memory, remains mostly unchanged over time and underscores deep cleavages in the way Ukrainians remember the past. The tendency to romanticize the Soviet era significantly increases as we move from the West to the East.
- Readiness for political violence, which refers to endorsement of violence for political goals has remained largely unchanged across the country. Where 0 refers to no one endorsing violent means to achieve political change and 10 means everyone condones political violence, the country average is 2.4. SCORE findings indicate a disconcerting picture particularly for Kyiv (3.62, Sumska (3.0) and Dnipropetrovska (3.0) oblasts.
- There is a moderate to low level of social tolerance towards certain groups such as immigrants, LGBTI, Roma communities and drug addicts. Where 0 means total intolerance and refusal to coexist with different groups, and 10 means strong acceptance of diversity, the country average is 4.8. Overall, considering the dramatic increase in social tolerance in Zakarpatska (from 4.0 to 6.7) and Poltavaska (from 4.9 to 5.8) compared to 2016 findings, it is important to unpack the drivers of social tolerance and better understand the dynamics in these oblasts to identify pragmatic ways of improving societal harmony and coherence in Ukraine.
- Civic engagement and participation are vital for healthy democracies and inclusive economic growth. However, formalized civic engagement and participation in civic initiatives remain considerably low (0.6) with Ivano-Frankivska (1.6), Zakarpatska (1.4) and Rivnenska (1.4) oblasts in the West trending notably higher than the country average. On the other hand, the country average for active citizenship, which refers to willingness to take non-violent action to improve one's society, is 3.9. This illustrates that while significantly more Ukrainians are ready to engage, they either engage informally (e.g. parent unions and apartment management rather than civil society or local authority efforts) or fail find the time or appropriate mechanisms to engage in their localities.
- Tolerance to corruption, which refers to condoning corruption and accepting it as part of daily reality has increased dramatically from 1.5 in 2016 to 2.2 in 2018.
- Pro-EU orientation that embraces the perceived benefits of the EU and support for EU membership have decreased across the country from 6.5 in 2016 to 5.9 in 2018. Overall, we can observe more significant decreases in pro-EU orientation on the oblast level, particularly in Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Zhitomirska, Vinnytska and Kirovogradska. This decrease can be attributed to a growing sense of fatigue and disappointment regarding the conflict in the East, as well as wavering confidence in EU stability. It is also underpinned by widespread cynicism about the benefits of EU membership, which many believe will disproportionately favor the social and political elites, without trickling down to the general population. Pro-EU orientation which is built on anti-Russia narratives and closely linked with NATO membership rather than values and human rights remains highly polarizing.

On the whole, the public debate on the EU needs to focus on prosperity, citizenship, tolerance and a sense of a local and regional community. Shifting the EU narrative from a political and economic block that can counter insecurities and fears regarding Russia to social welfare, service delivery, and good governance is paramount to building a unifying vision for the future of Ukraine. As such, the fostering a progressive EU orientation that is not about ‘deterrence’ but is about constructive citizenship, sustainable economic development and democracy are essential.

**Table 1. SCORE Ukraine civic attitude indicators**


| Civic Attitudes and Political Orientations | SCORE 2016 Country Average | SCORE 2018 Country Average | Oblast Level Observations (2018)  |   |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| <b>What improved?</b>                      |                            |                            | <b>Highest</b>  | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Civic optimism                             | 4.7                        | 5.2                        | Volynska (7.1)  | Luhanska (3.8)  |
| Exclusive Ukrainian nationalism            | 5.8                        | 5.0                        | Volynska (7.0), Lvivska (6.9)   | Donetska (3.2)  |
| <b>What remained somewhat unchanged?</b>   |                            |                            | <b>Highest</b>  | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Soviet nostalgia                           | 5.7                        | 5.3                        | Luhanska (7.2)<br>NGCA Luhansk (7.8)<br>NGCA Donetsk (7.3)                    | Ternopilaska (3.2), Volynska (3.3), Lvivska (3.4)                                     |
| Readiness for violence                     | 2.7                        | 2.4                        | Kyiv Oblast (3.2), Sumska (3.0), Dnipropetrovska (3.0)                        | Mykolaivska (1.1), Donetska (1.4)<br>NGCA Luhansk (1.9)<br>NGCA Donetsk (1.7)         |
| Social tolerance                           | 4.4                        | 4.6                        | Zakarpatska (6.7), Poltavaska and Mykolaivska (5.8)                           | Chernihivska (3.1), Volynska and Khmelnytska (3.2), Chernivetska (3.3)                |
| Civic engagement                           | 0.7                        | 0.7                        | Ivano-Frankivska (1.6), Zakarpatska and Rivnenska (1.4)                       | Khersonska (0.2)  |
| <b>What got worse?</b>                     |                            |                            |   |   |
| Tolerance for corruption                   | 1.4                        | 2.2                        | Chernivetska (4.0), Zaporizhzhya (3.8), Rivnenska (3.7)                       | Cherkaska and Khersonska (1.0), Volynska, Mykolaivska and Sumska (1.1), Lvivska (1.2) |
| Pro-EU orientation                         | 6.5                        | 6.0                        | Volynska (8.9)  | Donetska (4.3), Odeska (4.8)<br>NGCA Luhansk (4.5)<br>NGCA Donetsk (4.4)              |
| <b>SCORE Ukraine 2018: New Indicators</b>  |                            |                            |   |   |
| Belief in human rights                     | N/A                        | 6.5                        | Volynska (7.6), Poltavaska and Mykolaivska (7.3)                              | Ivano-Frankivska (5.0), Zhitomirska (5.2), Rivnenska (5.7)                            |
| Civic responsibility                       | N/A                        | 6.2                        | Lvivska (7.0), Poltavaska (7.1)   | Chernivetska (5.3)  |
| Sense of agency                            | N/A                        | 4.5                        | Ternopilaska (5.5), Volynska and Zakarpatska (5.4)                            | Mykolaivska (3.0)   |
| Experience of multiculturalism             | N/A                        | 4.1                        | Kyiv City (5.8), Zakarpatska (5.6), Poltavaska (5.2)                          | Ternopilaska (2.1) and Zhitomirska (2.4)  |
| Critical literacy skills                   | N/A                        | 4.4                        | Poltavaska (5.3), Vinnytska (5.1)<br>NGCA Luhansk (6.6)<br>NGCA Donetsk (6.6) | Volynska and Zhitomirska (3.6)  |
| Fear of economic instability               | N/A                        | 6.7                        | Sumska (7.7)  | Ternopilaska and Zakarpatska (5.4), Chernivetska (5.5)                                |
| Pluralistic Ukrainian identity             | N/A                        | 6.7                        | Khersonska (8.8) and Mykolaivska (8.2)  | Zakarpatska (4.9), Volynska (5.4), Zhitomirska and Ivano-                             |




|                         |     |     |   |   |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|---|---|
|                         |     |     |   | Frankivska (5.6) and Chernivetska (5.7)                         |
| Fatigue due to conflict | N/A | 6.8 | Luhanska (8.2), Cherkaska (7.6), Kyiv City, Kharkivska and Odeska (7.5) | Zakarpatska (4.8), Zhitomirska (5.3) and Ivano-Frankivska (5.4) |

Regional differences are striking (Figure 9 and Figure 10), with SCORE findings revealing clear social-political differences between western and eastern oblasts; while the southern oblasts of Odeska and Khersonska are more consistent with trends in the East than other parts of Ukraine. One such civic behavior indicator that shows strong regional variations is the perceived benefit of the EU and confidence in EU stability. Where 0 means that no one believes in the benefit of the EU and no one would vote positively in a potential referendum for EU accession, the country average across Ukraine is 6.0. The skepticism about the benefits of EU membership deepens as we move from the West to the East. While the strongest pro-EU orientation can be observed in Volynska (8.9), Lvivska (7.7), Ternopil'ska (7.4) and Rivnenska (7.1), pro-EU orientation is particularly weaker in Donetska (4.3) and Odeska (4.8), as well as in the “Donetsk People's Republic (DNR)” (4.4) and the “Luhansk People's Republic (LNR)” (4.5). Similar regional trend was observed also in 2016<sup>4</sup>.

**Figure 9. Perceived benefit of the EU**



**Figure 10. Confidence in EU's stability**




\*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmaps indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetska oblasts.

Figure 11 below illustrates the network of relations among different indicators, and indicator clusters. The size of the indicator bubble represents the degree of its connectedness in the network, while the color of connecting lines represents the nature of the relationship. **Blue** lines symbolize a positive relationship, and **red** lines symbolize a negative relationship. The thickness of the lines represents the strength of the relationship – the thicker the line the stronger the relationship. Investigating the civic attitudes (**green**) network, we can see the centrality of ‘civic responsibility’ with the most of number of connections. For instance, ‘tolerance to corruption’, which has a negative association with ‘civic responsibility’, shows itself as an obstacle to constructive citizenship. In addition to underscoring the importance of civic education, the civic attitudes network (**green**) also illustrates ‘multicultural experiences’, ‘social tolerance’ and open political dialogue as key entry points for fostering constructive citizenship. When we look at the future oriented national vision cluster (**blue**), the network analysis illustrates the strong negative correlation ‘pro-EU orientation’ has with ‘soviet nostalgia’ and ‘conservative values’. In other words, holding on and romanticizing the past and conservative tendencies undermine a civic optimism and support for the EU. On the other hand, the constructive policies network (**purple**) shows the strong relationship between ‘pluralistic Ukrainian civic identity’ and ‘support for reintegration’. These relationships highlight that

<sup>4</sup> It is important to keep distinction between Pro-EU orientation that is declining overall and Tolerant Progressives’ group that significantly grew in the eastern and southern oblasts, as the latter is also based upon intergroup feelings and tolerance towards different political orientations, which is improving. While very high unwavering support for EU may be on the decrease, strong rejection of the EU is on the decrease too.

fostering constructive citizenship underpinned by social tolerance, civic values, and a sense of community and empowerment could facilitate a shared future vision for Ukraine.


**Figure 11. Constructive citizenship network analysis**



**Predicting Opportunities for Change**

The advanced predictive analysis illustrated in the model below (Figure 12) shows the drivers of progressive-EU orientation, relating to a strong belief in the benefit of the EU, positive attitudes towards EU membership, weak conservative values, and low soviet nostalgia. The predictive model also shows the drivers of intergroup harmony, which includes openness to dialogue and positive feelings towards other groups, and lack of negative stereotypes towards different groups in society. While the **blue** lines represent a positive relationship, the arrows represent the reinforcing predictive effect of indicators. For example, the strongest predictor of Progressive EU orientation is feeling optimistic about the future of the country and the next generations (i.e. civic optimism), and believing that individuals can become agents of change in their communities (i.e. sense of agency), both of which can be significantly improved by investing in personal, political and economic security. On the other hand, while we can observe a very strong positive relationship between ‘family and community coherence’ indicators (refers to strong bonds in family, social connectedness and community cooperation) and ‘psychosocial functioning and mental health’ indicators (refers to absence of substance use, PTSD, depression and anxiety, low aggression and strong executive skills), the former is a strong predictor for social tolerance and belief in human rights, while the latter is a strong predictor of belief in human rights.

**Figure 12. Predictive model for Progressive EU orientation and Intergroup harmony**



\* Lines without arrow heads represent strong association, lines with arrow heads represent strong predictive relationship. For example, Civic optimism is a strong predictor of Progressive EU orientation, while family & community coherence and Psychosocial functioning and mental health are strongly associated with each other, while being predictors of belief in human rights.

Moreover, the predictive model above clearly demonstrates that improving ‘family and community coherence’ could create a positive multiplier effect on multiple desired outcomes. Similarly, ‘human security’ that includes personal, political and economic security, positively affects a sense of agency and civic optimism, and hence has a positive impact on progressive EU orientation. Combined with the diagnostic analysis presented above on the country and oblast level, the advanced predictive analysis helps us identify precise and strategic policy and program recommendations. **As such, policies and programs that promote community cooperation, entrepreneurship, social tolerance and a safe environment for open and inclusive dialogue that can foster political security are the key entry points to promote value-driven citizens who can become agents of change, and hence improve progressive, pluralistic and harmonious society in Ukraine.**

Considering the regional differences, and stronger skepticism towards the EU in the East and South of Ukraine, it is necessary to further investigate the drivers of pro-EU orientation to better understand the socio-political and economic dynamics that are specific to the southern and eastern oblasts. The model below, which corroborates the crucial role good governance plays (human security, service delivery and trust in institutions) on nurturing a Pro-EU orientation, is an analysis of causality using longitudinal panel samples from 2016 and 2018. The model shows that those who are more exposed to pro-Russian media have a lower trust in institutions. It is clear however, that effective institutions, that provide human security and deliver services, is an important driver of pro-EU orientation.

Figure 13. Cross-lagged predictive model (causal relationship)





Figure 13 above confirms that soviet nostalgia, which manifests itself as pro-Russia orientation, is in fact underpinned by the feeling of empathy and not by political aspirations. Although this indicator is negatively correlated with pro-EU orientation, and it is a predictor of pro-Russia orientation, it is an emotive civic attitude rather than a political one. The model shows that pro-Russia orientation is not in direct opposition to Pro-EU attitudes. Rather it is a product of Soviet nostalgia, which is itself driven by a longing for the past, based on a sense of community and belonging rather than political support for Russia’s foreign policy towards Ukraine. **In other words, neither is pro-Russia orientation is directly linked with pro-EU orientation, nor is it mutually exclusive with Pro-EU attitudes.** SCORE asserts that pro-Russia orientation is made up of multiple components, from historical ties to familial ties, and to seeing Russia as a market for economic cooperation. Some of these perceptions are illustrated in the Figure 14 below.

Figure 14. Support for cooperation with Russia



## Chapter 2: Support and Skepticism for the Ukraine Reform Process

### Summary of Key Findings

#### What improved since 2016?

- Economic, human and personal security improved for most oblasts.
- Infrastructure, state and social services improved significantly for all oblasts.
- Perceived level of corruption decreased.

#### What got worse since 2016?

- Support for all reforms (i.e. decentralisation, deregulation and anticorruption) except the privatization reforms, while very low, is declining. In addition to privatisation reform, people are most skeptical about health and pension reform.
- Tolerance for corruption increased significantly, which is eroding support for the reform process.

#### What remained the same since 2016?

- Trust in local and national authorities, as well as in security services and media institutions remained very low.
- Support for privatisation reform remained low.

#### What should be done?

- Invest political and material capital into anti-corruption policies which increase citizens' confidence in state institutions and demonstrate the Government's commitment to good governance.
- Economic security and constructive civic values have a positive correlation with support for reforms. Design targeted regional human security and poverty reduction policies and strategies which address the socio-economic disparities across the country.
- Launch a major national debate on the reform process and the future of Ukraine, ensuring people from all walks of life are included.


### Introduction

This chapter focuses on identifying the drivers and strategic entry points for improving support for the reform process in Ukraine. **The 2018 SCORE result show that public support for the reform process will improve if the government acknowledges and responds to citizens' concerns and anxieties about the changes the reform packages will bring. Citizens' collaboration and civic satisfaction is a prerequisite not only for the effective implementation of reforms but to ensure growing stability and social cohesion in Ukraine.** SCORE findings show a strong positive association between support for reforms and support for reintegration of Donbas, as well as a strong positive link between support for reforms and future oriented national vision that includes civic optimism, sense of agency and pro-EU-orientation. The SCORE Ukraine study can help us unpack the drivers of public support for the reform process and quantify underlying concerns and anxieties.

Since 2014, Ukraine has launched and enacted more reforms than during the preceding twenty-five years. However, public support for these reforms has not been universal, and their impact debatable. Mistrust in authorities is prevalent across Ukraine, which fuels skepticism towards the reform process. In fact, majority of Ukrainians believe the authorities have little interest in the welfare of citizens and avoid being accountable to constituents. Where 0 means that NO ONE believes that authorities are accountable and responsible, and 10 means that EVERYONE believes that authorities are accountable and responsible, the country average is a mere 3. Although Ukraine has achieved macroeconomic stabilization and reformed several important institutions, such as the police and the Supreme Court, and established new anticorruption agencies, major structural challenges remain. SCORE findings show that despite the notable growth in economic security (e.g. having a safe basic income) as well as state and infrastructure

services, the majority of Ukrainians do not consider the economic environment healthy for entrepreneurs. Majority of Ukrainians also express fears about an economic downturn, which discourages investments and undermines economic growth. The


**Figure 15. Perceptions about the economic environment and public authorities**



\* The bar-chart above represents scores for indicators, and should not be read as percentages. Where 0 means there the phenomena the indicator is measuring is not observed at all, 10 means that it is observed very strongly across Ukraine. For example, where 0 means that no one is concerned about future economic downturn, 10 means that everyone across Ukraine fears that Ukraine will suffer from economic instability in the near future.

While SCORE findings demonstrate a positive relationship between a human security and civic responsibility and sense of agency, which are direct drivers for support for reforms, they also show that support for reforms are eroded by mistrust towards authorities. The Figure 16 below shows that the country average of support for decentralization, deregulation and anticorruption reforms is 7.2, having dropped by 0.9 points from 8.1 in 2016. Governance reforms need to be built upon a new public service ethos that would make national authorities more trusted and effective partners of civil society in strengthening national and community resilience. The SCORE 2018 reveals that the mixed levels of support for different reform packages across different regions of Ukraine, and affirms the deep skepticism of many Ukrainians towards change.

**Figure 16. Combined support for decentralization, deregulation and anticorruption reforms**




The lack of confidence in the Government’s reform efforts is driven by perceived levels of corruption and mistrust towards institutions; evidence from the SCORE results shows that this is the key driver underlying the diminishing support for the reform process. **It is imperative that the publics’ confidence in governance institutions is restored through effective transparency, public participation and access to information mechanisms, if the reform process is to succeed.** Indeed, given its high level of support, the **effective implementation of anti-corruption reforms would most likely improve the support for other reform packages and facilitate the reform process overall.** Detailed analysis presented in this chapter can help improve the reform process by identifying entry points to address the key challenges and concerns of Ukrainians.

## Exploring Country Trends and Regional Differences


In 2018 over 60% of Ukrainians express support for financial decentralization, reduction in the number of civil servants and deregulation reforms. While the anticorruption reform receives 78% support, the public seems to be divided on health reform, and there is explicit concerns and anxieties regarding the pension reform (Figure 17). If managed inclusively and effectively, decentralization and anti-corruption reforms would offer a unique opportunity to reconfigure relations between civil society and national authorities, including in a holistic understanding of security (e.g. personal, economic, political and state security), and particularly at the local and regional levels. The fact that nearly 30% of Ukrainians responded “Don’t know” to the reform options about reduction of subsidies and deregulation reforms underscores the strong need for information campaigns and constructive public debate on these reform packages. A fundamental change towards inclusivity, effectiveness and accountability in institutional political, governance, security and organizational cultures as well as societal reconciliation and participatory dialogue is essential for continuous positive change and growth, and are the best antidotes to heal fractures in social cohesion.

**Figure 17. Support for reforms**




Although many of the reforms look good on paper, there is widespread public skepticism regarding their effective implementation. Figure 18 and 19 below demonstrate that Ukrainians and generally mistrust the national authorities and media outlets, and hence neither do they trust the information they receive about the reform process nor those who are tasked with implementing it.

**Figure 18. Trust in national authorities**




**Figure 19. Trust in media**



Ensuring that citizens better understand the reform packages and how they would improve their lives could considerably recuperate citizens’ collaborative attitude and support. Growing civic apathy and disconnectedness discussed in Chapter 1, and overall low confidence in institutions as well as slow progress in implementation can help explain the reasons behind why the reforms process has been losing support. A comparison between SCORE 2016 and 2018 findings (Figure 18) shows that while support for privatization reform enjoyed a very marginal increase, support for decentralization and deregulation as well as support for anticorruption reform has significantly diminished.

**Figure 20. Change in support for reforms since 2016**




\* The bar-chart above represents scores for indicators, and should not be read as percentages. Where 0 means there is no support for the reform option whatsoever, 10 means that there is strong, prevalent support across Ukraine. Differences higher than 0.5 points is considered statistically significant.

Figure 21 shows that although most Ukrainians understand the need for reform, many are deeply skeptical about the reform process due to lack of public confidence in their implementation underpinned by mistrust towards authorities and the belief that reforms will only benefit the elite. This is exacerbated by the perception that the reform process and their implementation has been mired in corruption, elite interests and inefficiencies. Strong levels of mistrust are closely linked with perceived levels of corruption, where for example, 43% of Ukrainians think that decentralization reform will lead to bigger corruption and neglect of community needs.



**Figure 21. Skepticism about reforms**




**A principal lesson from this assessment is that support for reforms is dependent on people seeing tangible improvements in their quality of life. The SCORE’s predictive analysis shows the direct relationship between improved human security (i.e. economic, personal and political security) with a positive attitude to civic responsibility and support to the reform process (see Figure 23).** Particularly for the eastern and southern oblasts, SCORE findings also show that improved human security<sup>5</sup> has even a stronger positive effect on perception of service delivery (e.g. education, health care, judicial and social services), and effective service delivery decreases the negative effect perceived level of corruption have on trust in institutions.

In this respect the government and international partners should build on the improvements in service delivery and human security that macroeconomic stabilization and the reform process has facilitated, and pay special attention to the regions of the country where little tangible progress has been made. For many Ukrainians progress to improve livelihoods is happening, but the pace of change is still too slow for people to feel fully confident about the reform process, and where it is leading.

The SCORE’s regional analysis shows the disparities in human security across Ukraine, with some oblasts being left behind, illustrated in Figure 22, which compares the changes in human security indicators between 2016 and 2018. While Poltavaska oblast has enjoyed significant improvements in this regard across the board, Zhitomirskaya in the north, Khersonska in the south and Zaporizhzhya the east has also benefited from increased human security. However, the central oblasts (i.e. Khmelnytska, Vinnytska, Cherkaska, Kirovogradskaya) have not enjoyed the same level of improvement in human security, and in some cases the situation has deteriorated.

<sup>5</sup> Human security includes personal, economic and political security. Economic security measures the level of access to and affordability of food to meet one's own and one's dependents' nutritional needs. Personal security refers to the degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life. Political security refers to the degree to which one feels comfortable expressing one's political views both collectively and individually without fearing consequences.

**Figure 22. Changes in human security indicators since 2016**



The citizens of Cherkaska, Mykolaivska, Odeska and Sumska oblasts, stretching from south to north, express significantly lower levels of personal security compared to Ternopilska, Volynska and Chernivetska in the west. Effective rule of law and policing, along with community and neighborhood initiatives are essential to improve citizens sense of safety and security from violence in daily life. As such, focusing on these oblasts could help garner confidence in governance institutions and support for the reform process. In addition to the deteriorating economic security in Khmelnytska, particular attention to improve citizens livelihoods and safe basic income in Sumska and Dnipropetrovska oblasts, which have the lowest levels of economic security, is necessary. On the other hand, perceptions regarding service delivery, including infrastructure (e.g. quality of road network and public transport), social services (e.g. education, healthcare and social benefits) and state services (e.g. passing and implementing laws, fighting crime) in Zakarpatska in the west and Khersonska in the south, while little progress has been reported in Chernivetska, Donetsk and Khmelnytska.

**Figure 23. Changes in service delivery indicators since 2016**




Table 2 below summarizes the SCORE findings related to the reform process, highlighting the key temporal changes between 2016 and 2018. Although we can observe an improvement in the perceived level of corruption, this should be considered in conjunction with the increased levels of tolerance to corruption; both of which would have a negative impact on the level of support for anti-corruption reform. Nonetheless, this reform receives the highest support comparatively, and considering the high skepticism about reforms' implementation, it should be prioritised as the protective reform that improve

support and acceptability as well as paving the way for the effective implementation of other reform packages. Comparatively, support for reforms are significantly lower in Poltavaska oblast, which can be partly explained by significantly lower trust in institutions including media outlets.

**Table 2. SCORE Ukraine support for reforms and governance and human security indicators**


| Indicators   | SCORE 2016<br>Country<br>Average | SCORE 2018<br>Country<br>Average | Oblast Level Observations (2018)   |   |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| <b>What improved?</b>                                |                                  |                                  | <b>Highest</b>   | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Perceived level of corruption                        | 7.6                              | 7.1                              | Sumska (8.7)   | Ivano-Frankivska (5.8),<br>Chernivetska and<br>Zhitomirska (6.1)                      |
| <b>What remained somewhat unchanged?</b>             |                                  |                                  | <b>Highest</b>   | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Free market orientation                              | 4.1                              | 4.3                              | Zaporizhzhka and Volynska (5.1)  | Zakarpatska (2.6)   |
| Trust in local authorities                           | 3.2                              | 3.3                              | Ternopilska (4.4), Zakarpatska and Volynska (4.3)  | Kirovogradska (2.2)   |
| Trust in national authorities                        | 2.2                              | 2.2                              | Zakarpatska (3.9)  | Mykolaivska (1.4),<br>Donetska (1.5)  |
| Trust in institutions including media                | 3.4                              | 3.2                              | Zakarpatska and Ternopilska (4.5)  | Sumska, Donetska and Khmelnytska (2.5),<br>Poltavska (2.6)                            |
| Support for privatization reform                     | 3.5                              | 3.8                              | Volynska (5.8), Zhitomirska (5.1), Mykolaivska (4.9)   | Poltavska (1.8),<br>Chernihivska (2.3),<br>Ternopilska (2.7),<br>Khersonska (2.8)     |
| <b>What got worse?</b>                               |                                  |                                  | <b>Highest</b>   | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Support for anticorruption reform                    | 8.8                              | 7.8                              | Mykolaivska and Ternopilska (9.6), Volynska (9.3), Vinnytska and Cherkaska (9.2), Lvivska (9.0), Zakarpatska and Khmelnytska (8.8) | Poltavska (3.9),<br>Chernivetska (4.1)  |
| Support for decentralization and deregulation reform | 7.4                              | 6.7                              | Volynska (8.7), Ternopilska (7.7), Kyiv City (7.6), Lvivska (7.5)  | Poltavska (3.4),<br>Chernivetska (5.3),<br>Kirovogradska (5.7)                        |
| Tolerance for corruption                             | 1.4                              | 2.2                              | Chernivetska (4.0), Zaporizhzhka (3.8), Rivnenska (3.7)  | Cherkaska and Khersonska (1.0), Volynska, Mykolaivska and Sumska (1.1), Lvivska (1.2) |
| <b>SCORE Ukraine Phase Two: New Indicators</b>       |                                  |                                  |  |   |
| Support for health and pension reform                | N/A                              | 3.9                              | Khmelnytska (6.6), Volynska (5.6), Kyiv City (5.4)   | Poltavska (1.9), Sumska (2.1)   |
| Skepticism about reforms                             | N/A                              | 6.8                              | Mykolaivska (7.8), Kharkivska (7.5)  | Chernivetska (5.3), Zakarpatska (5.4)   |
| Healthy entrepreneurship environment                 | N/A                              | 4.0                              | Kyiv City (5.1), Zakarpatska (4.9)   | Ternopilska (2.2), Khmelnytska (2.9)  |

## Predicting Opportunities for Change

Figure 24 illustrates the network of relations between indicators which most likely predict successful routes for garnering support for the national reform agenda. The size of the indicator bubble represents the strength of its connectedness in the network, while the color of connecting lines represents the


nature of the relationship - **blue lines** symbolize a positive relationship, and **red lines** symbolize a negative relationship. The thickness of the lines represents the strength of the relationship – the thicker the line the stronger the relationship. Significantly, tolerance to corruption and support for the separation of Donbas are strong negative drivers in the network that undermine the reform process (**purple**). The “support for reforms” indicator denotes positive attitudes to anticorruption, deregulation and decentralization, streamlining the civil service and improvements in public service delivery. These good governance elements are positively correlated with a future oriented national vision network (**blue**), affirming the positive relationship between support for reforms and building an optimistic national vision. **It builds on the analysis presented in Chapter 1, which demonstrates the vital role played by constructive citizenship in Ukraine’s democratization and EU accession processes. As such, pluralism, social tolerance and rejection of corruption are the key entry points for pushing the reform process forward.**

**Figure 24. Network analysis of indicators**



The advanced predictive analysis in Figure 25 shows the key drivers that reinforce or undermine support for reforms in Ukraine. While the **blue arrows** represent the reinforcing effect of predictors, the **orange arrows** represent the inhibiting effect of predictors. Conclusively, the strongest inhibitor of support for reforms is tolerance to corruption. On the other hand, civic attitudes such as social tolerance towards different groups, pluralistic civic identity (as opposed to an exclusive nationalistic identity), belief in human rights and civic responsibility and sense of agency (believing that individuals can and should become agents of change in their communities) are positive predictors of support for reforms. In other words, while support for reforms is undermined by tolerance to corruption, the model clearly underscores the importance of an inclusive, pluralistic and tolerant citizenry for the reform process. Moreover, the fact that information consumption and media do not feature in the model clearly demonstrates the need for objective and digestible information campaigns to improve citizens’ understanding and awareness of the reform packages as well as to trigger a constructive and inclusive public debate on the reform process.

Figure 25. Predictive model for support for reforms



## Chapter 3: Effects of the Conflict on Veterans and Their Relations

### Summary of key findings

#### Key findings

- Over 11 million (24%) Ukrainians are living with the consequences of conflict, either through direct experience of fighting, or as a close family member or friend of a former or current combatant.
- The human cost of conflict-affected people, who make up 24% of the population, is severe.
- Conflict-affected Ukrainians often have strong vocational and literacy skills, and these qualities should be used to help reintegrate them into society.

#### Effects of conflict on civic attitudes

- Higher discriminatory and negative attitudes towards different groups.
- Higher experience of marginalization.
- Pessimism about the future and civically disconnected.
- Low belief in human rights

#### Effects of conflict on psychosocial functioning and mental health


- Lower empathy and social skills.
- Higher incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, aggression, depression, drug use and suicidal tendencies.
- Lower family coherence and executive skills.

### Introduction

This chapter focuses on how exposure to conflict has impacted the wellbeing of Ukrainians, and it seeks to identify the drivers and strategic entry points for addressing the psychosocial and humanitarian consequences. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts focus on communities, groups, states and formal institutions, but beyond humanitarian assistance, the needs of individuals exposed to conflict are often overlooked. The human costs of conflicts are certainly devastating, resulting in death and maiming of hundreds of thousands as a direct result of conflict or conflict-related malnutrition, disease and illness. That conflict and crisis take a high human toll is hardly new. However, understanding the human cost, beyond battle-related deaths and life-changing injuries, is more challenging in terms of the impact of conflict on lost social capital, long term psychosocial effects, damaged infrastructure, economic downturn and deep fractures in social cohesion. The economist Paul Collier argued that wars are development in reverse<sup>6</sup> as it sets a country back both economically and socially, and regeneration and recovery can take decades if not generations. Such a long-term effect on human life, social capital and economic development is hard to measure. Verifiable and reliable assessments that help our understanding of the human cost of conflict is not only necessary for informed political and social decision-making, but it is a moral, ethical, legal and humanitarian imperative, necessary for societal justice and healing.

<sup>6</sup> Collier, P. (2004). Development and Conflict. <http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf>

**Figure 26. Map of Donbas region**



Since the start of the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine in April 2014, estimates put the number of conflict-related deaths at 10,090, including 2,777 civilians, while 23,966 people are estimated to have been injured and more than 1.6 million people have been internally-displaced.<sup>7</sup> The conflict divides families and communities, and with one million crossings each month across the 457-km contact line, thousands of people face delays and obstacles in accessing basic services, pensions, social benefits, and markets.<sup>8</sup> Over half a million people live in the “grey zone” near the contact line<sup>9</sup> between government-controlled areas and the non-government-controlled territories, and those who were combatants or families of combatants are affected the most.

conflict and associated psychosocial challenges such as PTSD, drug use and depression are among long-term challenges the country is facing. The analysis presented below identifies and highlights psychological and social elements that if left unaddressed can hinder recovery and progress and exacerbate the human cost of conflict in Ukraine.

## Exploring Country Trends and Regional Differences

According to different reports, 300,000-330,000 veterans have been demobilized after serving in eastern Ukraine, and over 10,000 volunteers, who have taken part in the conflict have returned.<sup>8</sup> Many veterans have trouble acclimating to civilian employment and civilian life, and many experience post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and other health issues. These challenges affect their families, friends and communities. **SCORE reveals that nearly 1 in 4 people (25%) in Ukraine have a direct relationship to conflict<sup>9</sup>, such as being a combatant themselves or having a close family member or a friend who was/is a combatant** (See Figure 27). This group also experiences deeper economic and political insecurities.

**Having a personal relationship to conflict has a strong impact on people’s position in society, the way they engage with others, their civic attitudes, psychosocial skills and mental health. The analysis presented below clearly illustrates that this vulnerable group is suffering from marginalization, poverty and loss of self-identity and they are finding daily life extremely challenging.** It is important to address the needs of this group, build the resilience of communities and promote social healing programs in order to ensure their reintegration in society as constructive citizens, particularly in the central, north and

<sup>7</sup> UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU): [www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730)

<sup>8</sup> UN New. (1 March 2018). <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1003891>


<sup>9</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/5a182d607.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> World Bank Report. (May 2017). Conflict in Ukraine: Socio-economic impacts of internal displacement and veteran return. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/571011497962214803/pdf/116489-REVISED-Updated-Report-Socioeconomic-Impacts-Internal-Displacement-Veteran-Ret.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> This group does not include the IDPs.

western oblasts of Kyivska (5.3) (and Kyiv City (5.1), Chernihivska (4.5), Zhitomirska (4.3), Vinnytska (4.3), Volynska (4.1), Lvivska (3.9), Cherkaska (3.8) and Khmelnytska (3.6).


**Figure 27. People who have personal relationship to conflict (i.e. veterans and their close relationships)**



\*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmap indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts.

Figure 28 below clearly illustrates the intensified psychosocial and mental health challenges of people who were combatants or have a family member or a friend who is/was a combatant in the East. A score of 10 denotes people who live with severe psychosocial problems resulting from their experience of conflict, and 0 means that there is no psychosocial impact. **People who have a direct relationship to conflict suffer from depression, suicidal tendencies and self-harm twice as much as people with no relationship to conflict. This conflict-affected group are almost four times more likely to use drugs. The relationship to conflict has a severe negative effect on this group’s executive functioning skills (the ability to control impulses, consider consequences of actions, plan tasks, focus attention and multi-task) and family coherence. The SCORE findings show that men and women from the conflict-affected group face different kinds of challenges. Women are more likely to suffer from poverty and express stronger levels of personal insecurity, and men are more likely to use drugs and express aggression in daily life.**

**Figure 28. The cost of conflict on psychosocial and mental health**



\* The bar-chart above represents scores for indicators, and should not be read as percentages. For example, where 0 means there no one experiences daily aggression, such as getting into fights and confrontations, and 10 means everyone frequently experiences aggression in their everyday, those people who have a direct relationship with conflict are expressing 3.5 times more aggression than those who do not.



Figure 29. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder




Figure 30. Aggression in daily life




Figure 29 and 30 above also illustrate that psychosocial effects of conflict spill over to oblasts with smaller number of veterans and veteran families too. Thus, in addition to the oblasts identified above (See Figure 24), social healing programs should also prioritize Ivano-Frankivska, Chernivetska and Rivnenska oblasts.

Moreover, relationship to conflict adversely affects civic attitudes. The SCORE findings show that conflict-affected people are more likely to have a pessimistic worldview and are part of the Disconnected group presented in Chapter 1. Table 3 below demonstrates how people with a personal relationship to conflict have a more exclusive and nationalistic Ukrainian identity, and a significantly higher tolerance to corruption. **They are civically disconnected and marginalized in society, and have stronger negative feelings and discriminatory social attitudes towards all groups.** However, despite having low community support and economic security, veterans and their close families and friends are more likely to have stronger vocational and literacy skills, which underscores their added-value to society if effective efforts are undertaken to support their rehabilitation.


Table 3. Cost of conflict on civic attitudes

| Civic Attitudes Indicators                                | Direct Relationship to Conflict | No Direct Relationship to Conflict | Difference between Groups |
|---|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Discrimination towards people with Pro-EU orientation     | 6.7                             | 1.0                                | 5.7                       |
| Marginalization   | 5.7                             | 1.0                                | 4.7                       |
| Belief in human rights                                    | 2.3                             | 6.5                                | -4.2                      |
| Discrimination towards people with Pro-Russia orientation | 5.4                             | 1.3                                | -4.1                      |
| Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity                            | 3.0                             | 7.0                                | -4.0                      |
| Civic optimism  | 1.0                             | 5.0                                | -3.9                      |
| Strength of national identity                             | 1.3                             | 5.1                                | -3.9                      |
| Intergroup tension towards people from Western Ukraine    | 6.2                             | 3.0                                | 3.2                       |
| Discrimination towards IDPs                               | 3.8                             | 1.0                                | 2.9                       |
| Sense of agency   | 2.4                             | 4.5                                | -2.1                      |
| Tolerance to corruption                                   | 4.0                             | 2.0                                | 2.0                       |
| Community cooperation                                     | 3.0                             | 4.5                                | -1.6                      |
| Intergroup Tension towards IDPs                           | 5.1                             | 3.6                                | 1.5                       |

|  |     |     |      |
|--|-----|-----|------|
| Intergroup tension towards people from Eastern Ukraine | 2.0 | 3.4 | -1.4 |
| Vocational and literacy skills                         | 6.2 | 4.8 | 1.4  |

Critically, the SCORE shows that people who have a personal relationship to conflict are much more likely to be vulnerable to poverty (see Figure 31). Where 0 means that no one is suffering from poverty or vulnerable to poverty, and 10 means that everyone is suffering from poverty (poverty index measures socio-demographic risk factors such as the size of the household size and number of dependents, employment status, land level of education and income), the country average is 3.9. It should be noted that country averages are weighted based on populations of oblasts to achieve national wide representativeness. This measure has no particular geographical character with oblasts from different regions such as Chernivetska, Vinnytska, Cherkaska, Sumska and Khersonska experiencing higher levels of poverty.

**Figure 31. Poverty Risk Index (Socio-Demographic Status Risk Index)<sup>10</sup>**




\*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmap indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts. The bar-chart represents scores for indicators, and should not be read as percentages. The oblast level scores reflect the prevalence of citizens' relationship to conflict. 0 means no one in that oblast has a personal relationship to conflict and 10 means that every single person in that oblast have a personal relationship.

## Predicting Opportunities for Change

Figure 32 below illustrates the network of relations between different psychosocial functioning indicators. The **green indicators** belong to the 'psychosocial and mental health network', and they are divided into two groups; the four indicators on top measure positive psychosocial traits and the four at the bottom measure negative psychosocial traits. The **blue indicators on the right-hand side of the model** belong to the 'constructive citizenship' network. The analysis illustrates the direct effect psychosocial functioning and mental health has on people's civic attitudes. We can observe that those people with psychosocial and mental health challenges are less likely to possess positive civic traits, which the SCORE has concluded is a crucial driver for a pro-EU orientation and support for the Government's reform process (See Chapters 1 and 2).

<sup>10</sup> Country average is calculated using weights per oblast...


**Figure 32. Psychosocial functioning and mental health network analysis**



\*The size of the indicator bubbles represents its connectedness in the network, while the color of connecting lines represents the nature of the relationship - **navy lines** symbolize a positive relationship, and **red lines** symbolize a negative relationship. The thickness of the lines represents the strength of the relationship – the thicker the line the stronger the relationship.

Similarly, the advanced predictive analysis in Figure 33 below, shows the predictive power of psychosocial functioning and social connectedness indicators and underscores the complementarity and multiplier effects of rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Given that conflict affected citizens make up over a quarter of the population if we included the IDPs as well, and that they are more likely to experience psychosocial, mental health and connectedness challenges, they need to be provided with special attention. Their role in supporting constructive change and their rehabilitation will be crucial for building resilient communities and advancing social cohesion. Conclusively, the two models illustrate that effective rehabilitation and healing programs would have a strong positive impact on fostering a human rights ethos and mitigating social marginalization, while reintegration programs and community initiatives for resilience would significantly improve social tolerance to diversity and a pluralistic Ukrainian civic identity.

**Figure 33. Predictive model for psychosocial functioning and social connectedness**



\*While the **blue arrows** represent the reinforcing effect of predictors, the **orange arrows** represent the inhibiting effect.

## Chapter 4: Intergroup Relations and Future of the Donbas

### Summary of Key Findings

What improved since 2016?

- Improved human security and civic optimism provides room for constructive dialogue.
- Sense of territorial integrity and unity of the people remains.

What got worse since 2016?

- Separatist tendencies gained more traction Ukraine, fuelled by war fatigue and the absence of any move towards a solution.

What remained the same since 2016?

- Across Ukraine peace talks continue to be supported.
- Ukrainians from either side of the contact line, as well as between eastern and western oblasts continue to feel intergroup tension and stereotypes.

What should be done?

- Confidence in government across the whole country needs to be restored if people are to believe reintegration is a viable option.
- Accelerate governance reforms and constructively reach out to the citizens of eastern Ukraine to address their needs and anxieties.
- Transform the negative stereotypes between different groups in the East and West via meaningful intergroup contact and dialogue particularly in Volynska, Ivano Frankivska, Lvivska and Kirovogradska.
- Invest in efforts aimed at fostering social tolerance and human rights ethos across the country to improve intergroup harmony.


### Introduction

This chapter presents the SCORE findings related to the conflict and the status of the Donbas region, and explores citizens' perspectives of different political outcomes for conflict resolution options. The conflict has reinforced the regional stereotypes, the East-West divide in Ukraine and polarized the political narrative, leaving few avenues for compromise. **Failure to end the fighting and to find a durable political solution has created a sense of disappointment and fatigue and reinforced negative stereotypes Ukrainians in the government-controlled areas (GCA) hold about the Donbas and its people, and the stereotypes Ukrainians in the East have about the people in the West. Fatigued by conflict, Ukrainians are growing disillusioned, disengaged and disinterested. Particularly in the East, the view that the national authorities are incompetent and indifferent to their fate; and the feeling of being abandoned by the rest of Ukraine and the wider world is palpable.**

Using diagnostic and predictive analysis methods, SCORE findings help identify entry points for building a shared vision of the country's future. Stakeholder consultations and focus group discussions that contributed to the calibration of the SCORE questionnaire and informed the interpretation of the survey findings revealed a prevalent concern regarding the intractable nature of the conflict and the strong


desire to reach a quick resolution before it became the new status quo, and the conflict lines became frozen in time. Participants also voiced their anxieties regarding the viability of reintegration and how that would be managed. Figure 31 below illustrates citizens' lack of confidence in Ukrainian authorities' commitment to the welfare of people and Government's capacities to resolve the conflict. **Confidence in government needs to be restored if people are to believe that the reintegration of the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) is viable.**

**Figure 34. Confidence in national authorities**



On the other hand, Figure 32 illustrates the strong and prevalent sense of fatigue and disillusionment across the country. Sense of fatigue, a new indicator developed for SCORE 2018 assesses the extent to which Ukrainians are disappointed, disengaged in relation to the conflict. Where 0 indicates that people are still thinking, talking and engaging in debates and discussions about the conflict, and 10 indicates that everyone is focused on their everyday business and daily survival, the country average is 6.8. Given that differences bigger than 0.5 are considered significant, we can see strong variances across the country, with oblasts such as Luhansk expressing a much stronger sense of fatigue than oblasts such as Zakarpatska and Zhitomirska. The lack of progress, low confidence in national authorities and strong levels of fatigue is crippling Ukrainians hope and belief in reintegrating the Donbas region as a positive and viable option.

**Figure 35. Fatigue due to conflict**




SCORE findings presented in this chapter conclusively show the strong relationship between positive intergroup relations and support for reintegration. In other words, intergroup tension between different groups such as IDPs, people with pro-EU orientation and people with pro-Russia orientation is a driver of support for separation. Civic optimism and responsibility, which are strong positive drivers of intergroup harmony and which mitigate against separatist tendencies, is mainly predicted by human security (economic, political and personal). However, when it comes to intergroup relations and attitudes towards the conflict, we can observe a clear West and East divide, as well as societal prejudices regarding the "other" region of Ukraine (See Figures 40 & 41). Considering that human security has improved since 2016 (See Chapter 2) and intergroup tension has not increased (See Table 1), there is room to reconcile

the negative feelings and stereotypes between the East and the West of the country. Intergroup tension between the eastern and western Ukraine manifesting into resistance to reintegration and hence, improving intergroup relationships would facilitate support for reintegration. **Transforming negative images of the “other” region requires positive participatory and constructive national dialogue, multicultural experiences, and fostering a pluralistic civic identity; all essential for building a common vision for the future.**

### Attitudes Towards Reintegration

There is ambivalence regarding solutions for the conflict in the East. Although granting special status is part of the Minsk Agreements signed in 2015, and still remains the most widely acceptable option, there are different concerns and dynamics that are shaping people’s attitudes towards reintegration or separation of the Donbas. Figure 36 illustrates that while many Ukrainians see granting special status to the NGCA of Luhanska and Donetska as a first step towards reintegration, others see it as a step closer to separation. This points to a lack of well-defined political direction and consensus in the NGCA but desire for autonomy in the NGCA is the key factor underpinning support for special status. The fact that opinion is split between those who see granting special status as a step towards reintegration (49%) or separation (50%) illustrates the ambivalence regarding special status and could denote that the opportunity for constructive negotiation has not entirely been missed.


**Figure 36. Perceptions about granting special status to NGCA in Luhanska and Donetska**



\* Columns on the left labelled as GCA refer to the sample collected from 9,018 people in the government controlled areas of Ukraine. Columns on the left labelled as NGCA refer to the sample collected from 1,042 people in non-government-controlled areas of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts.

Many Ukrainians consider granting special status a strategic loss for Ukraine and a first step towards separation. Although there is strong skepticism, partly due to ambivalence and ambiguity of what special status may look like, it is still perceived as a viable option in many parts of the country (See Figure 37). Where 0 means no one supports granting special status as a solution and 10 means everyone strongly supports it, the country average is 6. This option is least supported in Chernivetska, Kyiv Oblast and Ternopil'ska, while it receives significantly stronger support in Mykolaiv'ska.

**Figure 37. Supporting special status as a solution option**



While citizens in the government-controlled areas of Ukraine (GCA) consider the current situation and unification with Russia entirely unacceptable, separation into internationally recognized countries is also outright rejected by 50% of Ukrainians in the GCA. While the most supported option is decentralization (63%), special autonomy is supported by 56% of Ukrainians as the second-best option. Yet again, we can see that approximately 15% people remain ambivalent and undecided.

**Figure 38. What should be the future of the Donbas (GCA)?**





Figure 39 below compares the different attitudes and perceptions regarding the conflict in the Donbas, and shows that residence influences attitudes towards the nature of the conflict. Today, 54% of the people living in the NGCA are not willing to remain part of a reunited Ukraine, while 66% of citizens living in the GCA describe the conflict as an inter-state conflict rather than one between Ukrainian people. In the NGCA the opinion on whether the conflict is one between Ukrainians or between two countries is more evenly split, denoting the lack of a strong consensus on how to characterize the conflict in the Donbas region. The generally higher “Don’t know” responses to different questions among the citizens in the GCA is symptomatic of disillusionment, fatigue and ambivalence. Nonetheless, the data does point towards some sense of geographical and societal unity, as large numbers from both the GCA and NGCA support to varying degree the mutual dependence of the Donbas region and the rest of the country.

**Figure 39. How do citizens from the GCA and NGCA define the conflict?**



### Exploring Country Trends and Regional Differences

It is important to unpack the regional dynamics and underlying factors that shape Ukrainians' different attitudes towards the conflict in the East in order to understand what drives support for reintegration and separation, and to identify entry points to build national consensus on the best option forward. It is essential to mitigate the negative effects of physical division on intergroup relations and psychological barriers, and foster security, reconciliation and inclusion to pave the road for the eventual reintegration of the Donbas region, and wider project of reconciliation. Excluding people of Donbas from the national political dialogue will further deepen the divisions between the East and West, as well as the GCA and NGCA. The Government should use the reform process and the remaining sense of territorial integrity seen in Figure 39, to reshape its approach to the communities in the NGCA, emphasizing intergroup harmony, civic identity and inclusive governance as inducements for political compromise. For example, such efforts could include facilitating payment pensions, administrative services and trade, and encouraging community exchanges and dialogue,

Table 4 summarizes the SCORE findings related to intergroup relations and attitudes towards the future of the Donbas, highlighting the key temporal changes between 2016 and 2018. For example, while the support for Donbas reintegration has not changed over time, there is strong resistance to this option in Volynska, Zakarpatska and Chernivetska. Comparatively, citizens in Zhitomirska (an oblast in the north-west of the country) show significantly higher levels of mistrust towards people from western Ukraine (intergroup tension) and strongly support separation as a solution option. On the one hand, Volynska shows low support for both separation and reintegration (lack of consensus and strong sense of uncertainty), as well as amnesty and the Minsk Agreements, and expresses the highest level of intergroup tension towards people in the East (5.9); citizens in Zakarpatska also demonstrate higher than average levels of mistrust to people from the East (4.7). On the other hand, Luhanska and Donetsk, two oblasts that are closest to the contact line and physically divided due to the conflict, show high support for peace talks and the Minsk Agreements. High support for Minsk Agreements in NGCA supports that there is room to build consensus on granting special status as a conflict solution option as illustrated in Figures 34 and 35 above.




**Table 4. SCORE Ukraine support for reforms and governance and human security indicators**

| Indicators   | SCORE 2016 Country Average | SCORE 2018 Country Average | Oblast Level Observations (2018)  |   |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| <b>What remained somewhat unchanged?</b>             |                            |                            | <b>Highest</b>  | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Support for Donbas reintegration                     | 6.0                        | 5.9                        | Vinnitska and Kyiv Oblast (7.4), Mykolaivska (7.2), Khersonska (7.1), Ternopilska (7.0)   | Volynska (3.0), Zakarpatska (3.4), Chernivetska (4.4), NGCA Luhansk (4.0) NGCA Donetsk (3.2)              |
| Supporting Donbas separation                         | 1.4                        | 1.7                        | Zhitomirska (2.5) NGCA Luhansk (4.5) NGCA Donetsk (5.1)   | Volynska (0.2)  |
| Intergroup tension towards Western Ukraine           | 2.8                        | 3.0                        | Kirovogradska (4.3), Zhitomirska (4.0) NGCA Donetsk (4.5)   | Ternopilska (0.8)   |
| Support for peace talks                              | 7.0                        | 7.4                        | Mykolaivska (8.7), Odeska (8.4), Luhanska (8.3)   | Ivano-Frankivska (5.1)  |
| Support for Minsk Agreements                         | 5.8                        | 6.2                        | Luhanska (7.5), Odeska, Kyiv Oblast and Khmelnytska (7.2), Sumska and Donetska and Chernivetska (7.0) NGCA Luhansk (7.9) NGCA Donetsk (8.7) | Volynska (3.9), Zaporizhzhka (4.9)  |
| Support for amnesty                                  | 4.3                        | 4.7                        | Luhanska (5.6), Donetska (5.4), Zakarpatska (5.3) and Dnipropetrovska (5.2) NGCA Luhansk (6.9) NGCA Donetsk (6.5)                           | Volynska (3.2), Zhitomirska (3.3), Vinnitska (3.6), Lvivska (3.8)   |
| Intergroup tension towards Eastern Ukraine           | 4.1                        | 3.6                        | Volynska (5.9), Ivano-Frankivska (5.1), Lvivska (4.9), Khmelnytska and Zakarpatska (4.7)  | Donetska (1.9), Mykolaivska and Ternopilska (2.4), Khersonska (2.7) NGCA Luhansk (1.4) NGCA Donetsk (1.6) |
| <b>What got worse?</b>                               |                            |                            | <b>Highest</b>  | <b>Lowest</b>   |
| Support Ukrainian army operations                    | 4.1                        | 3.6                        | Volynska (6.0), Vinnitska (5.5), Ivano-Frankivska (4.7), Lvivska (4.9)  | Donetska (1.4) Mykolaivska (1.7), Odeska (2.3), Luhanska (2.8)  |
| <b>SCORE Ukraine Phase Two: New Indicators</b>       |                            |                            |   |   |
| Fatigue from conflict                                | N/A                        | 6.9                        | Luhanska (8.2), Kharkivska, Odeska and Kyiv City (7.5)  | Zakarpatska (4.8), Zhitomirska (5.3), Ivano-Frankivska (5.4)  |
| Supporting special status as a solution option       | N/A                        | 6.1                        | Mykolaivska (8.0), Luhanska (7.2), Khmelnytska (7.0)  | Chernihivska (3.8), Kyiv oblast (4.5), Ternopilska (4.8)  |
| Believing granting special status undermines Ukraine | N/A                        | 5.7                        | Lyivska and Cherkarska (6.9), Vinnitska (6.7)   | Zhitomirska y (4.3), Donetska (4.8)   |


Intergroup tension that indicates the extent to which one feels cold and hostile feelings towards the “other” region of Ukraine is illustrated in Figures 40 - 43 below. **SCORE findings show that the intergroup tension between the eastern and western oblasts are mirrored in the intergroup tension between**

people with pro-EU and pro-Russia orientation. While western Ukrainians see people in the East as less European and influenced by Russian propaganda, eastern Ukrainians view westerners as hostile nationalists who do not understand the different historical, economic, political and cultural experiences of the East. Where 0 means that everyone has warm and affectionate feelings towards the other group, and 10 means that everyone shares strong cold and hostile feelings, the country average for intergroup tension towards the West is 3.0 and towards the East is 3.6. Acknowledging the strength of diversity and the fluidity of identity across Ukraine, where all communities can accept the concept of harmonious coexistence with multiple identities, is an important step for allowing people in the East to express their historical kinship ties with neighbors in the Russian Federation, while still believing in the unity of Ukraine, and calling Ukraine their home. Crucially, this freedom should not be seen as an obstacle to eastern Ukrainians feeling solidarity with the Ukrainian nation and their fellow citizens to the West, and building such a diverse concept of pluralist and civic Ukrainian identity is essential for building social cohesion. Acceptance of a pluralistic civic identity would improve intergroup relations and facilitate support for reintegration. It is important to invest in efforts that can constructively help citizens step away from prevailing stereotypes and negative feelings entrenched in historical experiences.


**Figure 40. Intergroup tension towards people from Western Ukraine**




**Figure 41. Intergroup tension towards people with pro-EU orientation**



**Figure 42. Intergroup tension towards people from Eastern Ukraine**



**Figure 43. Intergroup tension towards people with pro-Russia orientation**




\*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmaps indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts.

## Predicting Opportunities for Change

The advanced predictive analysis in the Figure 44 shows the key predictors of intergroup harmony among different groups in Ukraine. While the blue arrows represent the reinforcing effect of predictors, the orange arrows represent the inhibiting effect. The thickness of the arrows symbolizes the strength of the relationship. Conclusively, the strongest predictor of intergroup harmony is social tolerance (thickest blue arrow), followed by belief in human rights, pluralistic Ukrainian identity and free-market orientation. On the other hand, social connectedness and community cooperation can create multiplier effects for a more tolerant, value driven and pluralistic society by fostering resilient and cohesive communities, as it has the most number of strong positive relationship. This corroborates the findings in Chapter 1 and 2

about constructive citizenship and support for reforms, where the predictive analysis emphasizes the vitality of positive civic attitudes and human security, and their linkage with achieving progress.


**Figure 44. Predictive model for intergroup harmony**



The predictive analysis reinforces the strong link between support for reintegration and intergroup harmony. The predictive model in Figure 45 shows how positive civic attitudes and intergroup harmony undermine support for separation, and hence builds on the analysis from the previous three chapters by interweaving constructive citizenship, support for reforms and measures to ameliorate the human cost of conflict. In this regard the SCORE provides clarity on specific socio-political pathways towards reintegrating the Donbas region.

- Improving good governance and human security through the effective implementation of reforms (improving economic, political and personal security, and positive entrepreneurship environment) will help foster positive civic attitudes;
- Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for those with a direct relationship to conflict would address marginalization and embolden positive civic attitudes which facilitate intergroup harmony and reintegration, and hence positively influences political support for reintegration;
- Fostering constructive citizenship (belief in human rights, civic optimism, civic responsibility, pluralistic identity and free-market orientation) via social connected and community initiatives would help rejuvenate hope and build a common national vision for the future.

Figure 45. Predictive model for support for separation of Donbas



## Chapter 5: Policy Directions and Recommendations

### Investing constructive citizenship and making the EU project vehicle for strengthen civic responsibility and good governance

The unresolved conflict in eastern Ukraine has hardened psychological barriers among citizens and compounded physical divisions. The main message from SCORE 2018 is that this uncertainty regarding the future of the country is deepening as most Ukrainians become increasingly disconnected from civic life. The dominant traits of this apathy and disconnectedness is low civic optimism regarding the future, low social tolerance to diversity (See Figure 43), growing normalisation of corruption as part of daily life, and cynicism towards EU's stability and benefit. Further, political violence propensity to achieve political goals and aggressive tendencies to resolve problems need to be highlighted as areas of concern that need further attention (See Figure 44). These characteristics, while key obstacles to building a value-driven constructive citizenship in Ukraine, are perpetuated by a weak governance environment which fuels mistrust in state institutions and undermines the country's progress towards EU accession.

Figure 46. Readiness for violence





Figure 47. Social tolerance



\*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmaps indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts.

**The SCORE findings demonstrate that current attitudes are creating a negative and reactionary public mind, which sees the EU project as a counterweight to Russian aggression, rather than a basis for a strong democratic, rules-based society which is tolerant and embraces diversity.** The SCORE conclusively demonstrates the negative causal link between soviet nostalgia and pro-EU orientation but that this nostalgia is underpinned by a longing for a sense of community and belonging (or to 'better past times'), rather than political support or desire to re-imagine the USSR. In other words, **SCORE findings confirm pro-Russia orientation as a manifestation of soviet nostalgia rather than a strong political preference or support for Russia's current polity, and subsequently, is not mutually exclusive with Pro-EU attitudes.** Emphasizing a pluralistic Ukrainian identity and dispelling the idea that the EU-Russia dynamic is a zero-sum game where citizens must make a choice between a westward or eastward leaning preference is critical. SCORE Ukraine findings show that **social tolerance to diversity and pluralistic civic identity, which are among the key drivers for constructive citizenship, pro-EU orientation, support for reforms as well as support for reintegration, are key entry points for efforts in this direction.**

Furthermore, the SCORE predictive analysis shows that the principal drivers of a progressive EU orientation is citizen optimism for the future (civic optimism), and believing that individuals can become agents of change in their communities (sense of agency). Both these elements sit within a broader good governance environment which needs to be underpinned by human security, community and family coherence and individual wellbeing. From this perspective, **good governance measures need to strengthen the relationship between the individual citizen and the state,** and the SCORE findings suggest the following policy directions:

- Accelerate ongoing reform processes which seek to bring government closer to the people, with particular emphasis on effective implementation of decentralization and the creation of strong local governance institutions that efficiently plan and implement development policies through participatory and inclusive mechanisms and provide access to quality social services. Processes of citizen engagement could focus on strengthening stakeholder feedback and review mechanisms, the design and implementation of citizen voice mechanisms (e.g. citizen report cards, regular townhall meetings to discuss community needs), and increasing avenues for public information disclosure.
- Civil society initiatives and efforts can also be strengthened by building civil society – business – public institutions relationships by supporting incentives for corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects and matching civic efforts with the business partners, as well as by providing micro-grants and shared civic spaces. Considering that Ukrainian government is a large-scale consumer itself, including CSR in public procurement and tender evaluation criteria could facilitate the development of an attractive CSR framework via providing incentives. It could also be a pragmatic push towards building a triangular relationship between civic society, businesses and public institutions to address shared societal problems beyond charity work (e.g. multicultural experiences, human rights, gender equality and environmental security) to help foster constructive citizenship in Ukraine.
- Ensuring that the access to information law that entered into force in 2011 is implemented effectively at the national and local levels can help citizens' engagement and improve confidence in public institutions while helping to curb tolerance to corruption and facilitate anti-corruption reform. Although Open Government Partnership Independent Reporting Mechanism (OGP - IRM) reports that Ukraine's progress for improving access to information, corruption prevention mechanisms, and bringing citizens in government decision making is "truly impressive", it falls short in effectively improving government accountability and the level of corruption.<sup>11</sup> Transparency International report 2017 ranks Ukraine 130 out of 180 countries with a score of 30 out 100. This is corroborated by the SCORE findings on the perceived level of corruption in Ukraine as well (See Figure 46). In particular, efforts to improve transparency in areas such as public contracting, natural resource extraction and disclosure of public officials' assets can help improve Ukraine's anti-corruption and accountability performance.
- Implement measures which will strengthen civic literacy across the country, helping to improve Ukrainian citizens' awareness of their civic duties and rights. Positive socialization and civic education is necessary to empower young people to contribute become agents of change in their communities. Particularly targeting Ukrainian youth, civic education is among national priorities within the National Strategy on Civil Society Development for 2016-2020. The current education reform that plan to embed civic education into the secondary school curriculum should prioritize civic identity, civic responsibility and social tolerance to diversity among its teachings and ensure that civic education is used to nurture a tolerant, responsible and value-driven young generation to counteract the nationalist tendencies and negative effects of conflict on civic engagement. Although there are a number of initiatives on non-formal civic education these need to be scaled up and sustained particularly in Volynska, Lvivska, Chernihivska, Khmelnytska and Chernivetska oblasts where exclusive nationalist tendencies and social intolerance are strong.
- Strengthening social tolerance should be considered hand in hand with strengthening the human rights ethos across Ukraine, but particularly in Chernihivska and Zhitomirska in the north, Volynska, Rivnenska, Khmelnytska, Ivano-Frankivska and Chernivetska in the West. Human rights education must not become a compartmentalized aspect of policy programming but must be infused throughout all social cohesion and reconstruction activities. Establishing mechanisms where citizens are encouraged to report cases of human rights violations to community leaders, police or human rights organizations; and swift judiciary mechanisms to deal with incidents of human rights violation can be further reinforced by peace education approaches, where gender equality and tolerance to diversity are integral parts of learning. Teachers, local authorities and spiritual and religious leaders


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<sup>11</sup> <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/independent-reporting-mechanism>


are key actors, who can play a central role in promoting messages of pluralism, tolerance and solidarity.

- Intensify efforts to nurture social tolerance and human rights by effectively implementing anti-discrimination and anti-hate speech efforts, supporting and scaling up existing civil society efforts (i.e. Light of Hope, who supports people with HIV/AIDs or IREX Global Libraries initiative, that promotes access to information) and establishing Social Adaptation Centres to provide services to marginalized groups (i.e. temporary shelter, vocational training to match the labour market demand). Particularly, Roma people, LGBTI community, and people struggling with substance abuse problems are among the most marginalized in Ukraine, and may face “double” or “triple” exclusion owing to their gender, age or other characteristics.


**Figure 48. Strength of civic initiatives**



**Figure 49. Perceived level of corruption**



Which key positive civic attitudes should be prioritized to create a strong impact for constructive citizenship and where?



**A successful reform agenda will serve as a positive engine for change and improve confidence in public institutions**

Ukraine’s future social-economic success and road to sustained political stability is based on the country’s capacity to implement key reforms. It’s a truism that no reform is ever successful unless people take

ownership of how they change a country, and the SCORE shows that Ukraine's reform process is intimately linked to a strengthened notion of active and responsible citizenship.

Although most Ukrainians understand the need for reform, the reform process is characterized by deep skepticism; a lack of public confidence underpinned by mistrust towards authorities and the belief that reforms will only benefit the elite. This is exacerbated by the perception that the process to implement the reforms has been mired in corruption and inefficiencies. The generally high level of tolerance for corruption, married with the low levels of trust in state institutions points to a crisis of confidence in Government's ability to manage change. This crisis of confidence is also mirrored in Ukrainians' attitudes about viability of reintegration of Donbas as a solution and points to an urgent need to demonstrate the tangible benefits of reform by improving the human security of citizens. Public confidence would facilitate the entire transition process, which requires government transparency, public participation, access to information and tangible evidence that reforms are bringing social and economic benefits. A principal lesson from the assessment of SCORE findings is that support for reforms is dependent on people seeing tangible improvements in their quality of life. The SCORE's predictive analysis shows the direct relationship between improved human security and support to the reform process particularly for the eastern and southern oblasts.

The major policy challenges for the government gravitate around a) strengthening mechanisms which will make government accountable to citizens and promote trust in state institutions b) demonstrate real progress in combatting corruption, with the effective implementation of anti-corruption reforms likely to bolster support for other reform packages; c) provide quality public services to all parts of the country, and pay special attention to regions whose social and economic status is falling behind and d) implement measures which provide citizens with objective and digestible information on the reform process, its benefits and connection to a progressive national vision for the future. From this perspective the SCORE 2018 findings suggest the following policy directions:

- The Government needs to strengthen accountability mechanisms which will allow citizens to better understand the reform process currently taking place in the context of the European Union Association Agreement, considered the roadmap for reforms aimed at meeting the requirements for eventual EU membership. This should encompass national and local debates and an ongoing public discourse on the benefits of the reform process and its impact on citizens.
- Establish one-stop citizens' service centers to ensure the local population's needs are assessed while public is provided with access to timely and reliable information on matters that affect their lives ranging from birth certificates to driving licenses. Although provision of infrastructure, state and social services had been improving, the overall perception particularly about infrastructure and state services is not positive. For example, while infrastructure is rated the lowest in Sumska, state services are rated lowest in Poltavaska and Kharkivska (See Figure 48 & 49). To strengthen provision of services and confidence in governance institutions, training programs for people who have low internet literacy can also be a complimentary approach to enable and to benefit from online services ranging from utility payments to access to information.
- The results of the 2016 national consultation on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) need to be translated into people-responsive strategies for advancing the reform agenda. During the national consultation, 1,000 participants identified improved good health and wellbeing, decent work and economic growth, and peace, justice and strong institutions as priorities for the country. Building the capacities of government at all levels and citizen groups to formulate, implement and monitor evidence-based policies in these areas and other public policy measures, will serve as a major step towards enhancing government accountability.
- Anti-corruption reform receives the highest support among Ukrainians, and thus, it should be prioritized as the protective reform that improves support and acceptability. It can pave the way for the effective implementation of other reform packages, particularly privatization reform, which receives the lowest level of public support. The results and performance of the National Anti-



Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) need to be widely disseminated and officials of the agency should describe their activities in national and local public forums. A national scorecard for reducing corruption should be established to demonstrate the effectiveness of government action. On the other hand, information and dialogue efforts should prioritize on Poltavaska, where support for all reform packages are significantly lower.

- Although multiple national and organisations are supporting national and local government and civil society partners in developing effective anti-corruption messaging and tested communication products, with the ultimate goal of decreasing tolerance to corruption, SCORE findings show that tolerance to corruption has significantly increased since 2016. Thus, not only these efforts need to be scaled up and intensified, but a more integrated and holistic approach to fighting corruption and supporting the effective implementation of the anti-corruption reform is essential. In addition to the recommendations about accountability and transparency and listed above, mechanisms to increase citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts should be expanded and consolidated, including complaint management systems, implementing social audits and conducting public consultations to improve citizen inputs in the fight against corruption. National and local government bodies and civil society organisations should jointly design and deliver zero tolerance messages on corruption through social media and traditional media.
- Human security outcomes must be at the forefront of a legislative reform programme which aims to improve the legislative environment for developing small and medium enterprises. Human security being a core driver in almost all SCORE predictive models, is the departure point for nurturing a healthy entrepreneurship environment.
- This means paying special to oblasts where social and economic development has been lagging behind. For example, SCORE shows that the central oblasts (i.e. Khmelnytska, Vinnytska, Cherkaska, Kirovogradska) have not enjoyed the same level of improvement in human security as other neighbouring oblasts, and in some cases the situation has deteriorated. Reliable data on the social and economic conditions of all of Ukraine's oblasts should be collected on a regular basis to guide annual public expenditure planning and budgeting exercises.

Figure 50. Provision of infrastructure





Figure 51. Provision of state services




- \*Two circles on the right-hand side of the heatmaps indicate the scores for NGCA in Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts.

### Addressing the hidden burden of conflict is a moral necessity


SCORE 2018 shows that the hidden burden of conflict has a debilitating impact on citizens' capacities to function in society. The data shows that almost 25% of Ukrainians have a relationship with conflict and its consequences, and that people in this category are far more likely to be poor, suffer from mental health conditions and be civically disconnected. These traits are strong negative predictors of support for progressive reforms, peace talks and constructive citizenship. **Rehabilitation, reintegration and providing conflict-affected Ukrainians with the**

**skills to be constructive citizens needs to be part of the national project.** The vulnerability of people who have a relationship with conflict challenges Ukraine’s society and institutions, as thousands of former combatants, combatant families and internally displaced persons (IDPs) struggle to manage mental health conditions in a country where such issues are taboo, and the state offers minimal support.

**Figure 52. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder**



**Figure 53. Depression, self-Harm & suicidality**



\*Where 0 means that no one is suffering from depression, self-harm and suicidality, 10 means that every single citizen is severely suffering from these conditions.

The demonstrable linkage between psychosocial challenges and the quality of the individual’s civic responsibility towards constructively engaging with good governance outcomes, points to the need to robustly address the mental health issues of thousands of vulnerable people. Policy priorities in this direction need to address the following.

- Services for treating PTSD should be mainstreamed into mental health and social care systems, and policies adopted to ensure individuals, families and communities have ongoing access to healthcare and support.
- Health care professionals and social service providers should be trained in managing PTSD, depression and anxiety, and up-to-date guidelines for effective care of such conditions should be developed and implemented.
- Former combatants, their families and IDPs should be assessed for mental health issues and treatment provided to these groups as a matter of urgency.
- Intensified social healing programmes should be delivered in the oblasts of Ivano-Frankivska, Chernivetska, Rivnenska and Zhitomirska, since the concentration of people living with some form of mental health condition is particularly high.
- A program for interpersonal skills training and cognitive skills development should be designed for individuals who show severe antisocial behaviors, which are the result of exposure to conflict and its consequences.
- Non-violent communication and anger management programmes should target communities with high levels of political violence propensity and aggression in Kyiv Oblast, Sumska, Dnipropetrovska, Chernivetska, Ivano-Frankivska and Zhitomirska.
- Establish job centres that can support the rehabilitation and retraining of former combatants to be reintegrated into economic life.
- Strengthen public professionals (e.g. nurses, police, doctors, education authorities’) capacity and knowledge in order to effectively address recovery priorities and psychosocial needs of conflict-affected groups.

## Policies for decentralization and promoting diversity offer the prospect for a political compromise

Failure to end the fighting and to find a durable political solution, despite different high-level agreements, has created a sense of disappointment and fatigue, which caused further disengagement and sense of disconnectedness among Ukrainians. **Although intergroup tension has not increased since 2016, it is still a concern across the country.** Particularly in the East, the view that the national authorities are incompetent and indifferent to their fate; and the feeling of being abandoned by the rest of Ukraine and the wider world is palpable. SCORE findings show that the intergroup tension between the eastern and western oblasts are mirrored in the intergroup tension between people with pro-EU and pro-Russia orientation. While western Ukrainians see people in the East as less European and influenced by Russian propaganda, eastern Ukrainians view westerners as hostile nationalists who do not understand the different historical, economic, political and cultural experiences of the East.

Recommendations to contribute to ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine and provide the incentive for Donbas citizens to actively pursue the reintegration of their region, build upon the basic pillars of the SCORE 2018 findings. These revolve around improving good governance and human security through the effective implementation of reforms (improving economic, political and personal security, and positive entrepreneurship environment), promoting constructive citizenship (belief in human rights, civic optimism, civic responsibility, pluralistic identity and free-market orientation), and rehabilitating citizens suffering from mental health conditions resulting from their relationship with conflict. Acknowledging the strength of diversity and the fluidity of identity across Ukraine, where all communities who call Ukraine home can harmoniously co-existing, is an important step towards reconciliation, reintegration and social cohesion. The inclusion of Donbas residents, as equals, in this socio-political discourse is essential for de-conflicting the current tensions between the GCA and NGCA. The Government needs to use the impetus of its own reform process to reshape its approach to the communities in the East, emphasizing intergroup harmony, civic identity and inclusive governance as inducements for political compromise. In this context the following policy directions need urgent consideration.

- Inclusive participatory dialogue that addresses concerns and insecurities about viability, human security and intergroup harmony would help build a shared national vision for reintegration. The broad nationwide support for some form of special status for the Donbas requires all parties to the conflict to work more intensively to agree a form of decentralized government arrangement which will bring an end to the political crisis. All parties to the conflict need to build safe spaces in the Donbas to allow local government officials and civil society to run constructive and participatory dialogues on the future of the region and use the results to design targeted and evidence-based confidence building measures (CBMs). In other parts of the country, open discussion platforms in townhalls with experts and public intellectuals, and televised open debates can be a first step towards building a unified and pluralistic Ukrainian narrative through inclusive public dialogue that addresses the needs, concerns and anxieties of the citizens.
- Conducting focus groups and further research in Kirovogradska, Chernihivska, Luhanska, Volynska and Zakarpatska oblasts as well as NGCA Luhansk and NGCA Donetsk would improve our understanding and help address their concerns and fears regarding the reintegration of Donbas and granting special status.
- The Government could facilitate the development national programmes through schools and the media on an inclusive Ukrainian identity which embraces multiculturalism in the Ukrainian context, and celebrates cultural and linguistic diversity.

## Glossary

| Indicator   | Indicator Description   |
|---|---|
| Accountability of authorities                     | The degree to which one feels that the local and national authorities are accountable, act with public interest at heart and bear responsibility for their actions.   |
| Aggression in daily life                          | The extent to which one is aggressive in daily life, such as frequently getting into fights and confrontations.   |
| Authoritarian values                              | Preferring a strong leader as a single decision-maker, at the expense of a system of checks and balances.   |
| Authorities care                                  | The degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities care for the well-being of all Ukrainian citizens.   |
| Belief that special status will undermine Ukraine | Belief that granting special status to currently occupied territories in the east would mean strategic loss of Ukraine.   |
| Belief in human rights                            | The degree to which one recognizes and believes human rights and civil rights as essential for social cohesion.   |
| Blames Russia and rebels                          | The extent to which one blames Russia and rebels for the military conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.  |
| Blames Ukraine and the West                       | The extent to which one blames Ukraine and the West for the military conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.   |
| Civic engagement                                  | Citizens' active engagement in formalized civic and political matters using non-violent means such as participation in public hearings, petitions and demonstrations.   |
| Civic optimism                                    | The extent to which the present generation is believed to be in a better or worse position compared to past or future generations.  |
| Civic responsibility                              | The extent to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country.   |
| Community cooperation                             | The degree to which one feels that people in their community care for each other and cooperate to solve common problems.  |
| Confidence in EU's stability                      | The extent to which one believes that EU is a stable union and that membership creates long term benefits for acceding countries.   |
| Conservative values                               | The extent to which one holds conservative values towards women and LGBTI and believe that European values are undermining the Ukrainian traditional value system.  |
| Support for cooperation with Russia               | The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing economic, civic, political, cultural and family ties with Russia acceptable or desirable. This indicator is comprised of four individual indicators, namely: Support for maintaining family ties; Support for economic cooperation; Support for political cooperation; and Support for cultural cooperation with Russia. |
| Critical literacy skills                          | Ability to critically engage with information by corroborating, questioning and identifying potential biases.   |
| Depression, self-harm & suicidality               | The degree to which one feels depressed or very sad and expresses suicidality and tendencies to self-harm.  |
| Empathy   | The degree to which one feels empathetic towards others and shares the feelings of others.  |
| Executive functioning skills                      | Ability to control impulses, consider consequences of actions, plan tasks, focus attention and multi-task.  |
| Endorsement of national policy about the conflict | The degree to which people think that their country is going to the right direction with regards to resolving the conflict.   |
| Experience of multiculturalism                    | The extent to which one has been exposed to diverse cultures and met people from different racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds than their own.  |
| Family coherence                                  | Relations with family members and relatives, strength of familial ties.   |
| Fatigue from conflict                             | The degree to which one feels disappointed, disillusioned and fatigued due to the conflict.   |
| Fear of economic instability                      | The degree to which one feels fears that Ukraine will face economic downturn and crisis in the near future.   |
| Free market orientation                           | The degree to which one supports elements of free market like privatization and free market competition.  |

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| Human security                              | Human security includes personal, economic and political security. Economic security measures the level of access to and affordability of food to meets one's own and one's dependents' nutritional needs. Personal security refers to the degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life. Political security refers to the degree to which one feels comfortable expressing one's political views both collectively and individually without fearing consequences. |
| Information consumption                     | The degree to which one uses different sources of information such as radio, TV and online sources.   |
| Intergroup contact                          | Frequency of direct contact with members of various groups in society, such as IDPs and people in the non-government-controlled areas.  |
| Intergroup discrimination                   | The degree to which one discriminates members of different groups in society such as IDPs, people with pro-EU or pro-Russia orientation and etc.  |
| Intergroup social threat                    | The degree to which one feels that members of different groups may be a threat to their well-being.   |
| Intergroup tension                          | The degree to which one has cold and hostile feeling towards members of different groups in society.  |
| Marginalization                             | Feeling of social exclusion because of one's position in society (e.g. level of income, education) or identity.   |
| Negative stereotypes                        | The degree to which one has negative stereotypes towards different groups in society.   |
| Openness to dialogue                        | Openness to engage in dialogue with various groups in society.  |
| Optimistic traits                           | The degree to which one feels positive about their future.  |
| Perceived level of corruption               | Perceived level of corruption as measured by the frequency of informal payments in various sectors.   |
| Perceived EU benefit                        | Perceived socio-economic benefits of EU membership for different sectors (e.g. farmers, small businesses, manual workers, the social value system).   |
| Perspective taking                          | The degree to which one is inclined to take another person's perspective before making a judgement.   |
| Pluralistic Ukrainian identity              | The belief that everyone despite their ethnic and cultural background who calls Ukraine home are an integral part of society.   |
| Positive attitudes towards decentralization | The extent to which one believes that decentralization reform is viable and desirable as a means to improve efficiency and accountability.  |
| Positive entrepreneurship environment       | The degree to which one feels that Ukraine has positive environment and legal framework for entrepreneurship activities.  |
| Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)       | Experiencing persistent mental and emotional stress that is triggered after exposure to a traumatic or dangerous event.   |
| Pro-EU orientation                          | The degree to which one supports EU integration and NATO membership, and would vote positively in a potential EU accession referendum.  |
| Pro-Russia media consumption                | The extent to which one is exposed to Russian media sources.  |
| Pro-Russia orientation                      | The degree to which one supports Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and believes in the organic and historical link between the two countries.   |
| Infrastructure services                     | The extent to which one is satisfied with quality of road network and public transport.   |
| Social services                             | The extent to which one is satisfied with delivery of public services such as education, healthcare, judicial and social services.  |
| State services                              | The degree to which one feels satisfied with delivery of state services such as passing laws, fighting crime, implementing laws.  |
| Readiness for violence                      | Propensity to use violent means to achieve political change.  |
| Relationship to conflict                    | Denotes if someone is/was a combatant or has a close family or friend who are/were combatants in Donbas   |
| Sense of agency                             | The degree to which one feels that ordinary people can change things in their community.  |
| Skepticism about reforms                    | The degree to which one feels skeptical about the reform process and believes that they will only benefit the elite.  |
| Social skills                               | Possessing skills that facilitate social interaction and communication with other people.   |

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| Social tolerance                                   | The degree to which one is tolerant towards different groups (e.g. Muslims, Jews, Roma) in terms of personal interaction and/or acceptance in the community.  |
| Soviet nostalgia                                   | The extent to which one regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union and believes that life was better before 1991.   |
| Strength of civic initiatives                      | The extent to which one believes that civic initiatives and efforts are impactful and effective in their community.   |
| Substance use                                      | Frequency of tobacco, alcohol or drug use.  |
| Support for amnesty                                | The level of support for granting amnesty to certain groups under certain conditions.   |
| Support for anticorruption reform                  | Level of support for anti-corruption reform.  |
| Support for decentralization & deregulation reform | Level of support for decentralization & deregulation reform.  |
| Support for granting special status as a solution  | The degree to which one feels that granting special status is acceptable as a solution option.  |
| Support for health and pension reform              | Level of support for health and pension reform.   |
| Support for Minsk Agreements                       | Level of support for Minsk agreements as a roadmap to peaceful resolution of the conflict.  |
| Support for peace talks                            | The degree to which one supports peace talks as opposed to military operation as a way to resolve the conflict.   |
| Support for privatization reform                   | Level of support for privatization reform.  |
| Support for rebel & Russian operations             | The degree to which one considers Russian military intervention and continued rebel military activities as a way to resolve the conflict.   |
| Support for Donbas reintegration                   | The degree to which one supports full reintegration of the non-government-controlled areas territories and prefers to return to the political arrangement before the crisis or at the same decentralized status as other oblasts. |
| Support for separation of Donbas                   | The degree to which one supports separation and partition of the non-government-controlled territories.   |
| Support for Ukrainian army operations              | The degree to which one considers intensification of Ukrainian military operations as a way to resolve the conflict.  |
| Tolerance to corruption                            | The degree to which one feels that corruption is part of daily life and cannot be avoided.  |
| Trust in community                                 | Level of trust in different members and non-government institutions in their community, such as Church, media, civil society and volunteer organizations, their workplace and neighbors.  |
| Trust in all institutions                          | Level of trust in different institutions in their society including, national, local and media institutions.  |
| Trust in local authorities                         | Level of trust in key local institutions in society such as the Oblast State Administration, Town Administration, local civil society organizations, etc.   |
| Trust in media                                     | Level of trust in key media outlets, including private, national and community media.   |
| Trust in national authorities                      | Level of trust in key national institutions such as the President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and courts.   |
| Trust in security services/institutions            | Level of trust in the police and the Ukrainian Army.  |
| Ukrainian nationalism                              | The degree to which one believes that only ethnic Ukrainians should have say in political affairs in Ukraine and determine its future.  |
| Vocational and literacy skills                     | Self-assessment of one's knowledge and aptitude in terms of vocational and literacy skills such as computer and English skills, as well as reading and writing.   |

The analysis and recommendations presented in booklet based on the SCORE Ukraine Phase Two process, which was launched in Spring 2017 and completed in June 2018. SCORE Ukraine adapts The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) index, which is an evidence-based assessment instrument with diagnostic and predictive qualities that aims to inform strategic decision-making and policy and program design. It draws inspiration from multiple scientific disciplines while being flexible enough to incorporate new research findings, global policy guidelines and the realities of each local and regional context. Developed by SeeD in partnership between UNDP, and funded by USAID, SCORE has been implemented in multiple contexts beyond Cyprus, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, Ukraine, Liberia, Moldova and Iraq.

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